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agencies responsible for administering the financial assistance to 
effectuate the title's prohibition against sex discrimination by 
IX of the cited statute is composed of seven sections, 09 901-907. Hereafter all citations 
will be to the United States Code. 
20 U.S.C. 0 1681 (Supp. IV, 1974) provides: 
(a) Prohibition against discrimination; exceptions. 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, 
except that: 
(1) Classes of educational institutions subject to prohibition. 
In regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall apply 
only to institutions of vocational education, professional education, and gradu- 
ate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher educa- 
tion; 
(2) Educational institutions commencing planned changes in admissions. 
In regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall not 
apply (A) for one year from June 23, 1972, nor for six years after June 23, 1972, 
in the case of an educational institution which has begun the process of changing 
from being an institution which admits only students of one sex to being an 
institution which admits students of both sexes, but only if it is carrying out a 
plan for such a change which is approved by the Commissioner of Education or 
(B) for seven years from the date an educational institution begins the process 
of changing from being an institution which admits only students of one sex to 
being an institution which admits students of both sexes, but only if it is carry- 
ing out a plan for such a change which is approved by the Commissioner of 
Education, whichever is the later; 
(3) Educational institutions of religious organizations with contrary religious 
tenets. 
This section shall not apply to an educational institution which is con- 
trolled by a religious organization if the application of this subsection would not 
be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization; 
(4) Educational institutions training individuals for military services or mer- 
chant marine. 
This section shall not apply to an educational institution whose primary 
purpose is the training of individuals for the military services of the United 
States, or the merchant marine; and 
(5) Public educational institutions with traditional and continuing admissions 
policy. 
In regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public institution 
of undergraduate higher education which is an institution that traditionally and 
continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students 
of one sex; and 
(6) Social fraternities or sororities; voluntary youth service organizations. 
This section shall not apply to membership practices- 
(A) of a social fraternity or social sorority which is exempt from taxation 
under section 501(a) of Title 26, the active membership of which consists pri- 
marily of students in attendance a t  an institution of higher education, or 
(B) of the Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian 
Association, Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, and voluntary youth 
service organizations which are so exempt, the membership of which has tradi- 
tionally been limited to persons of one sex and principally to persons of less than 
nineteen years of age. 
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promulgating  regulation^.^ Exercising that rulemaking authority, 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) is- 
sued in June 1975, its final title IX reg~la t ion.~  Following review 
(b) Preferential or disparate treatment because of imbalance in participation 
or receipt of Federal benefits; statistical evidence of imbalance. 
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to 
require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment 
to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with 
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in 
or receiving the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in 
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any 
community, State, section, or other area: Provided, That this subsection shall 
not be construed to prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under 
this chapter of statistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance 
exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such 
program or activity by the members of one sex. 
(c) Educational institution defined. 
For purposes of this chapter an educational institution means any public 
or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of voca- 
tional, professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an educa- 
tional institution composed of more than one school, college, or department 
which are administratively separate units, such term means each such school, 
college, or department. 
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. N, 1974) provides: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Fed- 
eral financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, 
loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized 
and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect 
to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general 
applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the 
statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action 
is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and 
until approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted 
pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to 
grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient 
as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity 
for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination 
or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or 
other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited 
in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompli- 
ance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, 
however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency 
concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply 
with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured 
by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant 
or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed 
pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file 
with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over 
the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and 
the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty 
days have elapsed after the filing of such report. 
3. 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1975). The regulation was published in the June 4, 1975 edition of 
the Federal Register. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975). 
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by Congres~,~  the regulation became effective July 21, 1975.5 
Although title IX and HEW'S regulation raise several signifi- 
- 
cant legal issues,l this comment identifies and evaluates only one: 
4. See notes 60-74 and accompanying text infra. 
5. 45 C.F.R. $ 86.1 (1975). 
6. For example, title IX excepts private undergraduate schools from the requirement 
not to discriminate in admissions; but the title includes within the scope of the prohibition 
"professional" schools. 20 U.S.C. 8 1681(a)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974). There is an overlap 
between the inclusion and the exclusion and hence a conflict that HEW attempted to 
resolve in the regulation 
With respect to coverage of admissions to institutions of professional and voca- 
tional education, the Secretary has interpreted the statute as excluding admis- 
sions coverage of professional and vocational programs offered a t  private under- 
graduate schools. Thus, admission to programs leading to a first degree in fields 
such as teaching, engineering, and architecture a t  such private colleges will be 
exempt under paragraph 86.15 (d). A number of comments were received urging 
the Secretary to change his interpretation of the statute in this area. Even after 
reassessing the Department's position on this issue, the Secretary believes that 
Congress did not address the overlap between the term "professional" and the 
term "undergraduate." Thus, the Secretary remains convinced that, while that 
section of the statute pertaining to admissions might be read as including pro- 
fessional degrees wherever they are offered, the statute can also be read as 
stating that admissions to private undergraduate schools were to be totally 
exempt. 
40 Fed. Reg. 24130 (1975). 
Also, many women's organizations argued that HEW, through title IX regulations, 
should monitor and censor sexism and sex stereotyping in textbooks, primers, and readers. 
HEW declined the invitation on constitutional grounds: 
As stated in the preamble to the proposed regulation, the Department recog- 
nizes that sex stereotyping in textbooks and curricular materials is a serious 
matter. However, the imposition of restrictions in this area would inevitably 
limit communication and would thrust the Department into the role of Federal 
censor. There is no evidence in the legislative history that the proscription in 
title IX against sex discrimination should be interpreted as requiring, prohibit- 
ing or limiting the use of any such material. Normal rules of statutory construc- 
tion require the Department, wherever possible, to interpret statutory language 
in such a way as to avoid potential conflicts with the Constitution. Accordingly, 
the Department has construed title IX as not reaching textbooks and curricular 
materials on the ground that to follow another interpretation might place the 
Department in a position of limiting free expression in violation of the First 
Amendment. 
40 Fed. Reg. 24135 (1975). A feminist responded to this argument in these terms: 
Sex bias in materials is one of the most serious kinds of bias in education, 
probably among the most damaging. HEW has never backed up its argument 
on the first amendment by a legal brief. 
I think it should be noted we have looked very carefully a t  the legal issues 
since the NOW legal defense fund certainly does not want to win rights for 
women a t  the expense of us all. We concluded that in the area of public elemen- 
tary and secondary education, that there is no first amendment bar to some kind 
of coverage of textbooks which are already centrally selected by public school 
officials, and in higher education I think there is a somewhat different question. 
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Is HEW'S title IX regulation ultra vires, that is, does the regula- 
tion improperly extend or modify the will of Congress as ex- 
pressed in title IX? In light of this restricted focus, the comment 
is limited in two other important ways. First, the history and 
scope of title IX and HEW'S regulation are considered only to the 
extent that they illuminate the ultra vires issue. Second, this 
comment does not enter into the debate over the wisdom and 
desirability of the social policy decisions reflected in HEW'S title 
IX regulation;? rather, it attempts only to determine whether the 
regulation is inconsistent with the original title IX legislation or 
otherwise conflicts with legal  principle^.^ 
Two fundamental historical facts underlie passage of title IX 
in 1972: (1) the national resurgence of the women's movement, 
particularly among academic women, in the second half of the 
1960's' and (2) the emergence and publication of evidence that 
sex discrimination was widely practiced in American education. 
We submitted a legal memorandum to HEW to  t h a t  effect, and that  
[they?], unfortunately, have ignored it and have decided to go on without any 
coverage a t  all. 
Hearings on Sex Discrimination and Sex Stereotyping in Vocational Education Before the 
Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Educational of the House Comm. 
on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1975) (Ms. Holly Knox, Director, 
Project on Equal Education Right, National Organization of Women) [hereinafter cited 
as Hearings on Vocational Education]. The National Organization of Women (NOW) 
memorandum referred to is reprinted a t  121 CONG. REC. S774-77 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1975). 
7. A large portion of that debate is found in Hearings on Sex Discrimination Regula- 
tions Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Educa- 
tion and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited a s  1975 Hearings on Title 
1X Regulation]. 
8. This comment is restricted in its inquiry to those principles and policies that would 
be cognizable by a court reviewing the title IX regulation and exercising a proper measure 
of judicial self-restraint. 
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has identified the limitations on judicial review of 
administrative regulations in these terms: 
In reviewing a legislative rule [promulgated by an agency] a court is free 
to make three inquiries: (1) whether the rule is within the delegated authority, 
(2) whether it is reasonable, and (3) whether it was issued pursuant to proper 
procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirabil- 
ity or wisdom of the rule, for the legislative body, by its delegation to the agency, 
has committed those questions to administrative judgment and not to judicial 
judgment. 
1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.05, a t  314-15 (1958). 
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A. The Women's Movement and Higher Education 
The resurgence of the women's movement in America gener- 
ated a politically active and somewhat discrete submovement, 
the academic women's movement, sufficiently self-interested to 
take political and legal steps to eradicate sex discrimination in 
American education. Academic women's groups, generally more 
conservative and less radical than other feminist organizations, 
effectively focused their political and legal efforts not on the 
rights and advancement of women in general but rather on the 
rights and status of women within academe? 
Early legislation prohibiting sex discrimination, however, 
provided academic women no legal tools with which to attack 
discrimination in education. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964IR prohibited sex discrimination in employment, but educa- 
tional institutions were expressly exempted from the coverage of 
the title? The Equal Pay Act of 1963,12 designed to counter "the 
widespread and blatantly discriminatory practice of paying 
women less than men for the same work,"13 likewise excluded 
academic women from its coverage.14 
9. For a general history of the academic women's movement and the political action 
taken by academic women see Klotzburger, Political Action by Academic Women, in 
ACADEMIC WOMEN ON THE MOVE 359 (1973). 
10. 78 Stat. 253 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
11. The original 5 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, provided that: 
This title shall not apply to . . . an educational institution with respect to the 
employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational 
activities of such institution. 
12. 29 U.S.C. 5 206(d) (1970). The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was an amendment to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970). 
13. Murphy & Ross, Liberating Women-Legally Speaking, in WITH JUSTICE FOR
SOME 112 (1970); see B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. ROSS, SEX DISCRIMIN~TION 
AND THE LAW 440 (1975) [hereinafter cited as B. BABCOCK]. See generally Johnson, The 
Equal Pay Act of 1963: A Practical Analysis, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 570 (1975). 
14. When Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Fair Labor Standards Act 
of 1938 provided in pertinent part that: 
The provisions of sections [206] and [207] of this title shall not apply with 
respect to- 
(1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or 
professional capacity . . . . 
Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 9(a)(l), 75 Stat. 71, as 
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). To clarify that this exception applied to 
teachers, it was amended in 1966 by adding after "or professional capacity" the following: 
"(including any employee employed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel 
or teacher in elementary or secondary schools)." Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 5 214,80 Stat. 837 (1966), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (Supp. 
IV, 1974). 
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Indeed, prior to 1972, academic women's groups had only one 
effective legal tool against sex discrimination in higher educa- 
tion-Executive Order No. 11,246.15 That order prohibits sex- 
based and other forms of discrimination in employment by em- 
ployers, including colleges and universities,16 holding contracts 
with the federal government. Once a contract is made, the entire 
employing institution must comply with the nondiscriminatior, 
requirements even though only one department is involved in 
performing the contract.17 Also, the executive order requires af- 
firmative action whenever necessary to remedy effects of past 
discrimination. lA 
The most prominent and active of the academic women's 
groups, Women's Equity Action League (WEAL),I9 conducted a 
massive campaign against sex discrimination in education under 
Executive Order No. 11,246. In January 1970, WEAL filed with 
the Department of Labor a class action complaint against every 
college and university in the United States. Other academic 
women's groups soon followed WEAL'S example and brought 
complaints against the nation's law schools and such individual 
schools as Harvard. The Department of Labor delegated its inves- 
tigative responsibilities to HEW, which, after some prodding, 
responded to the charges with investigations of many of the col- 
15. 3 C.F.R. 169 (1975), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). 
Executive Order No. 11,246 was first issued by President Johnson on September 28, 
1965. It prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin, 
but not sex. Pressure from women's groups, however, resulted in an amendment on Octo- 
ber 17, 1967, extending the prohibition to sex discrimination. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 
C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 comp.) (effective October 13, 1968). All references in the text or 
footnotes to Executive Order No. 11,246 are to the order as amended by Executive Order 
No. 11,375. 
One feminist, commenting on Executive Order No. 11,246, stated that, "[ulntil Title 
VII was amended in March 1972, the Executive Order was the only remedy for discrimina- 
tion against academic women." Sandler, A Little Help From Our Government: WEA I, 
and Contract Compliance, in ACADEMIC WOMEN ON THE MOVE 439, 441 (1973) (emphasis 
in original) [hereinafter cited as Sandler] . 
For a discussion of the uses of Executive Order No. 11,246 as a legal tool against sex 
bias see B. BABCOCK, supra note 13, a t  509-59. 
16. Most colleges and universities in America hold contracts, usually for research, 
with the federal government and thus come within the scope of the order's prohibition. 
Sandler 440. 
17. B. BABCOCK 510; Sandler 442. 
18. Sandler 441-42. 
19. WEAL broke off from the National Organization of Women (NOW) in the fall of 
1968. The split was prompted by a disagreement over the abortion issue. WEAL focuses 
its "energies on legal and economic discrimination in education and employment and 
makes a special effort to recruit women who already occupy positions of power." Freeman, 
Women on the Moue: The Roots of Revolt, in ACADEMIC WOMEN ON THE MOVE 1,215 (1973). 
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leges and universities complained of by academic women's 
groups. 20 
These actions by academic women under Executive Order 
No. 11,246 focused the attention of both the federal government 
and the general public on sex discrimination in American higher 
education and thereby served to prepare the political arena for 
passage of title IX. WEAL'S complaints were accompanied by 
extensive materials documenting and substantiating that group's 
charges of di~crimination.~' Further, the resulting investigations 
of colleges and universities by federal agencies responsible for 
enforcement of Executive Order No. 11,246 brought to public 
attention additional evidence of sex bias in higher education.22 
B. Evidence of Sex Discrimination in Higher Education 
Congressional hearings in 1970 first served to widely publi- 
cize evidence of sex discrimination in American education.23 
Those hearings, as well as subsequent studies, revealed a clear 
pattern of discrimination against women students in admission 
to higher education,24 particularly to elite private universi t ie~.~~ 
Many witnesses and researchers also alleged discrimination in the 
award of financial aid to women,26 in c~unseling,~' and in place- 
20. The story of WEAL'S campaign and the parallel campaigns of other women's 
groups under Executive Order No. 11,246 is recounted in detail in Sandler, supra note 15. 
21. Id. a t  441. 
22. Id. a t  448-50. 
23. See Hearings on § 805 of H. R. 16098 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education 
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1970) 
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]. The charges, allegations, and evidence of discrimi- 
nation in education presented a t  the 1970 hearings are summarized and organized at 
Murray, Economic and Educational Inequality Based on Sex: An Overview, 5 VAL. U.L. 
REV. 237, 247-70 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Murray]. 
Some scholars had completed and published studies on sex discrimination in acad- 
eme prior to  the 1970 congressional hearings, e.g., H. ASTIN, THE WOMAN DOCTORATE IN 
AMERICA (1969); J. BERNARD, ACADEMIC WOMEN (1964); Bayer, College and University 
Faculty: A Statistical Description, 5 ACE REP. (1970); Bayer & Astin, Sex Differences in 
Academic Rank and Salary Among Science Doctorates in Teaching, 3 J .  HUMAN 
RESOURCES 191 (1968); Rossi, Status of Women in Graduate Departments of Sociology, 
1968-1969, 5 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 1 (1970), but perhaps because of the scholarly nature of the 
journals in which the studies appeared, they failed to attract wide public attention. 
24. 1970 Hearings 643-47 (testimony of Dr. Peter Muirhead, Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary, Associate Commissioner for Higher Education, Office of Education, HEW); 
CANNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 35-59 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE REPORT]; Roby, Institutional Bar- 
riers to Women Students in Higher Education, in ACADEMIC WOMEN ON THE MOVE 37, 38- 
44 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Roby]. 
25. CARNEGIE REPORT 51-53. 
26. E.g., 118 CONG. REC. 5808-09 (1972) (including remarks of Senator Bayh); Roby 
44-50. 
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ment efforts.2R The evidence revealed even greater discrimination 
against women faculty? Not only were women hired to teach a t  
a disproportionately lower rate than men,30 they were also ap- 
pointed to lower ranks than equally qualified or inferior men 
receiving new  appointment^.^^ Women faculty were also pro- 
moted a t  a slower rate32 and paid significantly less than their 
male  counterpart^.^^ In addition, women were "so rarely repre- 
sented in top academic administrative positions as to be practi- 
cally nonexistent in the upper echelons."34 
27. E.g., CARNEGIE REPORT 44-47; Roby 50-51. 
28. E-g., Murray 257-58. 
29. See, e.g., 1970 Hearings 196, 312, 645; CARNEGIE REPORT 109-26; Astin & Bayer, 
Sex Discrimination in Academe, in ACADEMIC WOMEN ON THE MOVE 333 (1973); Fidell, 
Empirical Verification of Sex Discrimination in Hiring Practices in Psychology, 25 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1094 (1970) ; Morlock, Discipline Variation in the Status of Academic 
Women, in ACADEMIC WOMEN ON THE MOVE 255 (1973); Robinson, Institutional Variation 
in the Status  of Academic Women, in ACADEMIC WOMEN ON THE MOVE 199 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Robinson]. 
30. See, e.g., Robinson 207 ("The general trend was to employ women at ratios lower 
than their proportion of earned degrees in respective fields."); CARNEGIE REPORT 110-11. 
The Carnegie Report noted that: 
[Dluring the decade of the most explosive growth in the history of higher 
education-the 1960's-women lost ground as a percentage of members of regu- 
lar faculty ranks in four-year institutions, especially a t  the associate professor 
level . . . . 
Id. a t  110. See also 1970 Hearings 645 (statement of Dr. Peter Muirhead, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, Associate Commissioner for Higher Education, Office of Education, HEW). 
31. A summary of several studies concluded that "the best women stand a chance of 
being hired but a t  a lesser position than inferior men." Robinson, supra note 29, at 212. 
The same survey, however, confessed that "little data" on appointment levels are 
available. Id. a t  210. 
Studies which used fictitious names and photographs (changed on the basis of sex) 
on job application resumes sent to colleges and universities demonstrated that women 
were offered lower levels of appointments than men. See, e.g., Fidell, Empirical 
Verification of Sex Discrimination in Hiring Practices in Psychology, 25 AM. PSYCHOI.OGIST 
1094 (1970). 
32. One study that analyzed reports prepared by educational institutions on their 
own practices found that "[elvery institutional analysis of promotion that examined 
length of time in rank showed that women progressed through the ranks a t  a significantly 
slower rate than men." Robinson, supra note 29, a t  216 (emphasis omitted). 
33. E.g., Morlock, supra note 29, a t  286. 
Several studies, by analyzing a multitude of factors such as rank and achievement 
characteristics, attempted to determine whether the lower compensation paid women was 
attributable to discrimination or a collection of objective factors. After controlling for the 
variables, the researchers found an average yearly salary difference of from 31,040 to 
$2,300 in favor of men. The studies are cited and summarized at CARNEGIE R PORT 115- 
19; Morlock, supra note 29, at  286-92. The work of one researcher, Elizabeth Scott, is set 
forth in detail in CARNEGIE REPORT 199-235 (appendix C); the results of some work by two 
pioneering researchers in the field, Astin and Bayer, are reported in detail in Astin & 
Bayer, supra note 29, a t  333-56. 
34. CARNEGIE R PORT 123. 
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In response to the evidence emerging from its hearings, evi- 
dence of discrimination contained in recent studies, the charges 
of sex discrimination brought by women's groups, and, no doubt, 
the increasing political strength of the women's movement, Con- 
gress began action that eventually culminated in passage of title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 
C. Congressional Action Leading to Enactment of Title IX 
In 1971, two aid to higher education bills introduced in the 
House of Representatives contained provisions to promote non- 
discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs. The 
prohibition of discrimination contained in the Nixon administra- 
tion's bill, H.R. 5191, was criticized as too susceptible of circum- 
vention. The measure prohibited sex-based discrimination by a 
"recipient of Federal financial assistance for any education pro- 
gram or activity," but permitted differential treatment "where 
sex is a bona fide ground for such differential treatment."35 Repre- 
sentative Edith Green's measure, H.R. 7248, on the other hand, 
constituted a more thorough-going attempt to prohibit sex dis- 
crimination and was adopted by the House in preference to the 
administration's bi11.3W.R. 7248 provided that no person "shall, 
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis- 
tance . . . ."37 The measure further proposed to amend title VII 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to eliminate the exemption extended 
to educational institutions; to amend the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
to extend the protection of that measure to teachers and profes- 
sors; and to grant to the United States Commission on Civil 
- - 
35. H.R. 5191, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 lM)l(a) (1971). 
Section 1001(b) of H.R. 5191 proposed to prohibit sex discrimination in employment 
by a recipient of federal financial assistance for any education program. It provided: 
No recipient of federal financial assistance for an education program or activity 
shall, because of an individual's sex-(1) discharge that individual, fail or refuse 
to hire (except in instances where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification) 
that individual, or otherwise discriminate against him or her with respect to 
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment; or (2) limit, segre- 
gate, or classify employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
that individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
or her status an an employee. 
Id. 8 1001(b). 
36. See 117 CONG. REC. 39248-61 (1971). 
37. H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001 (1971), 117 CONC. REC. 39098-99 (1971). 
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Rights authority to investigate sex discr iminat i~n.~~ 
Portions of the sex discrimination provisions of H.R. 7248 
were patterned closely on title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.39 
That title prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin in any program or activity receiving federal finan- 
cial a s s i s t a n ~ e . ~ ~  It further authorizes all federal agenices admin- 
istering such financial assistance to effectuate the title's prohibi- 
tion through appropriate regulations and, if the recipient of the 
funds fails to comply with the nondiscrimination provisions, to 
terminate the federal as~istance.'~ In adopting this scheme, H.R. 
7248 incorporated much of the language of title VI.42 
The Senate aid to higher education bill, S. 659, originally 
contained no reference to sex discrimination. In August 1971, 
however, Senator Bayh introduced an amendment to S. 659 gen- 
38. H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. $ 4  1006-08 (1971), 117 CONG. REC. 39099 (1971). 
Only the amendment of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 constituted a part of title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972 as finally enacted. Pub. L. No. 92-318, (i 906(b), 86 
Stat. 375, amending 29 U.S.C. 4 213(a) (1970) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (Supp. IV, 
1974)). See Johnson, supra note 13, a t  574-75 ("Title IX of the Education Amendments 
Act of 1972 represents an important extension of the [Equal Pay] Act by establishing 
that exemptions to the equal pay provisions of the [Fair Labor Standards Act] no longer 
apply to executive, administrative, and professional employees . . . ."). 
The proposed amendment of title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted in 
another bill, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Act of March 24,1972, Pub. 
L. No. 92-261, $ 3, 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970) (codified as 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. IV, 1974)). 
The provision of H.R. 7248 authorizing the Civil Rights Commission to investigate 
the problem of sex discrimination was deleted when the House sustained a point of order 
by House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler that the provision came within 
the jurisdiction of his committee. See 27 CONG. Q.  ALMANAC 595 (1971). The proposal was 
eventually passed as part of another measure. Act of Oct. 14, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-496, 
# #  3-4, 86 Stat. 813, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1975c(a) (1970) (codified as 42 U.S.C. 4 
1975c(a) (Supp. IV, 1974)). 
39. 42 U.S.C. $ 4  2000d to d-6 (1970). 
40. Id. $ 2000d. 
41. Id. 8 2000d-1. 
42. See 117 CONG. REC. 39098-99 (1971); Hearing on House Concurrent Resolution .?:I0 
(Title IX Regulation) Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the House Comm. 
on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975) (testimony of Representative 
O'Hara reviewing relationship of title IX to title VI). 
Representative Green's bill differed in some details from title VI. For example, title 
VI exempts discrimination in employment unless the primary objective of the federal 
grant or funding is to provide jobs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1970). H.R. 7248 in its final form 
contained no such exemption. (In its initial form, 117 CONG. REC. 39098-99 (1971), the bill 
contained the exemption because of a clerical error. For a discussion of the error and how 
it was remedied see 1975 Hearings on Title ZX Regulation 409 (testimony of Representa- 
tive O'Hara).) Also, while the former extends to any federally assisted program, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d (1970), the latter was expressly limited to education programs and activities. See 
117 CONC. REC. 39098 (1971). 
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erally similar to Representative Green's sex discrimination mea- 
sure yet containing several significant differences." Whereas the 
Green bill prohibited discrimination in "any educational program 
or activity receiving Federal financial a s~ i s tance , "~~  the Bayh 
amendment prohibited discrimination in "any program or activ- 
ity conducted by a public institution of higher education, or any 
school or department of graduate education, which is a recipient 
of Federal financial assistance for any education program or 
activity . . . ."45 Also, the Green bill directed all federal agencies 
involved in dispensing federal financial assistance to education 
programs to enforce the prohibition of sex discr iminat i~n;~~ the 
Bayh amendment, only HEWa4' 
Senator Bayh7s amendment was defeated in August 1971, 
when the Senate sustained a ruling by the Chair that the amend- 
ment was not germane.48 In February 1972, Senator Bayh intro- 
duced a somewhat modified version of his original amendment 
that  tracked almost exactly the language of Representative 
Green's House The modified measure prohibited sex dis- 
crimination only in education programs or activities receiving 
federal financial assistance and not in all programs conducted by 
an institution receiving assistance for any educational program. 
Further, the modified amendment directed every involved federal 
agency, not just HEW, to enforce the discrimination ban.50 The 
Senate adopted Senator Bayh7s modified amendment? 
On June 8, 1972, Congress adopted a conference version52 of 
the Green and Bayh antidiscrimination provisions as title IX of 
43. 117 CONG. REC. 30155-58 (1971). 
44. Id. a t  39098. 
45. Id. a t  30156. 
46. Id. a t  39099. 
47. Id. a t  30156. 
The Bayh amendment did contain one new proposal, however, which Congress even- 
tually enacted as part of title IX. That proposal constituted an amendment to titles IV 
and IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and authorized the Attorney General (1) to initiate 
legal proceedings on behalf of individuals suffering sex discrimination in admissions to or 
continued attendance a t  a public college, and (2) to intervene, on behalf of the United 
States, in such litigation already commenced by others. See id. at 30156-57; Education 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 5 906(a), 86 Stat .  375, amending 42 U.S.C. $ 5  
2000c(b), 2000~-6(a) (2), 2000~-9, 2000h-2 (1970). 
48. 117 CONG. REC. 30408-15 (1971). 
49. 118 CONG. REC. 5802-03 (1972). 
50. Id. a t  5803. 
51. Id. a t  5815. 
5'2. The action of the conferees on the sex discrimination provisions is reported at  S. 
REP. NO. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221-22 (1972). 
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the 1972 Education  amendment^.^^ President Nixon signed the 
measure into law on June 23, 1972.54 
A. History of the Title IX Regulation 
Soon after title IX was enacted, the Office of Management 
and Budget of the executive branch directed HEW to coordinate 
the efforts of the several agencies that fund education programs 
in their development of a title IX r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  HEW was to pro- 
vide leadership by drafting a regulation that would be suitable 
both for its own use and, with only slight modifications, for adop- 
tion and use by the other agencies involved? 
In June 1974, two years to the month after passage of the 
original legislation, HEW published its proposed title IX regula- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  It immediately generated a heated debate both in Congress 
and among the public. Nearly ten thousand formal responses to 
the proposed regulation were received during the extraordinary 
120-day comment period? Most of the objecting comments criti- 
cized the effect of the proposed regulation on intercollegiate ath- 
53. Congressional action leading to enactment of the 1972 Education Amendments 
is summarized, as is the legislation itself, a t  28 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 385-98 (1972). 
The Education Amendments of 1972 constituted a massive and unprecedented finan- 
cial aid package to higher education. As finally enacted, the measure authorized $19 
billion in aid to postsecondary education. The measure not only expanded the amount of 
federal financial assistance available to needy students, i t  also provided for financial aid 
to be paid directly to educational institutions. For example, the act authorized over $450 
million in aid to developing institutions and $40 million in aid to schools in serious 
financial distress. For a summary of the financial aid provisions of the Education Amend- 
ments of 1972 see id. 
54. Two HEW attorneys present a summary and analysis of title IX in Buck & 
Orleans, Sex Discrimination-A Bar to Democratic Education: Overview of Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972, 6 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1973). A student-written com- 
ment, Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimi- 
nation in Public Schools, 53 TEX. L. REV. 103 (1974), also analyzes title IX and, in 
addition, HEW'S proposed title IX regulation. 
55. Letter from Robert E. Coy, Assistant General Counsel, Veterans Administration 
to Brigham Young University Law Review, October 21, 1975. 
56. Id. 
57. 39 Fed. Reg. 22227 (1974). 
58. When HEW released its final title IX regulation on June 4, 1975, it described the 
comment period and the response to the proposed regulation in these terms: 
Interested persons were given until October 15, 1974, in which to submit 
written comments, suggestions, or objections regarding the proposed regulation. 
The Department received over 9700 comments, suggestions or objections . . . . 
40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975). 
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letics, social fraternities and sororities, and youth service organi- 
z a t i o n ~ . ~ ~  
On June 4, 1975, HEW published its final title IX regula- 
tion."That regulation did not become effective immediately, 
however. Section 431(d) of the General Education Provisions Act, 
as amended by the Education Amendments of 1974, required 
HEW to lay before Congress for a period of 45 days its final title 
IX regulation." This "laying before" provision was designed to 
give Congress an opportunity to review the regulation and, if 
found to be "inconsistent with the Act from which it derives its 
authority," to disapprove it in a concurrent re~olut ion.~~ If Con- 
gress passed such a disapproval resolution, HEW would be re- 
quired to redraft the offending portions; otherwise, the regulation 
would become effective at the end of the 45-day period.63 
Soon after the regulation was laid before Congress, members 
in both Houses introduced concurrent resolutions condemning 
the regulation either in whole or in part." After the introduction 
59. In May 1974, Senator Tower, anticipating the regulations' pervasive impact on 
athletics, introduced an amendment to the Education Amendments of 1974 exempting 
revenue-producing intercollegiate athletics from title IX's prohibition. 120 CONG. REC. 
S8488-89 (daily ed. May 20,1974). The amendment, in pertinent part and in its final form, 
read: 
This section [20 U.S.C. 9 16811 shall not apply to an intercollegiate ath- 
letic [activity] to the extent that such activity does or may provide gross 
receipts or donations to the institution necessary to support that activity. 
Id. a t  238488. The Senate adopted the amendment. Id. at  S8489. 
Senator Tower's amendment was deleted and replaced with an exceptionally vague 
compromise measure termed "the Javits amendment." That measure required that 
HEW'S regulations dealing with intercollegiate athletics consider "the nature of particular 
sports." Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612. 
Congress acted again in December 1974 by amending title IX to exempt the member- 
ship practices of social sororities and fraternities composed primarily of college students, 
the YMCA, YWCA, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, and other voluntary youth 
service organizations "the membership of which has traditionally been limited to persons 
of one sex and principally to persons of less than nineteen years of age." Act of Dec. 31, 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1862, amending 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (codified as 
20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a)(6) (Supp. 1976)). 
60. 40 Fed. Reg. 24127 (1975). 
Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of HEW, gives a brief history of the title IX rule- 
making process a t  1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 437-38. 
61. Education Amendments of 1974 § 509(a)(2), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232(d)-(g) (Supp. 
1976). 
62. 20 U.S.C.A. 4 1232(d) (Supp. 1976). 
63. 20 U.S.C.A. 4 1232(d), (e) (Supp. 1976). 
The "laying before" provision, its legislative history, and its implications for judicial 
review of the title IX regulations are discussed in detail in notes 95-114 and accompanying 
text infra. 
64. In the Senate, Senator Helms introduced a resolution that constituted a blanket 
disapproval of the regulation. S. CON. RES. 46,94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. S9715 
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of two resolutions in the Senate," however, that body took no 
further action on the matter? In the House, Representative 
O'Hara, chairman of the Postsecondary Education Subcommit- 
tee, introduced a concurrent resolution disapproving those por- 
tions of the regulation (1) requiring educational institutions to 
evaluate their own practices, identify areas of sex discrimination, 
and take corrective action where necessary; and (2) requiring 
schools to establish a grievance procedure to resolve sex discrimi- 
nation corn plaint^.^^ Following six days of hearings to determine 
whether the regulation was "consistent with the law and with the 
intent of the Congress in enacting the law,"68 the O'Hara subcom- 
mittee amended the resolution of its chairman to express disap- 
proval of the requirement that church-sponsored schools petition 
HEW for an exemption from provisions of the regulation incon- 
sistent with the school's religious tenets.6g The subcommittee re- 
ported the resolution to the full House Education and Labor 
C ~ m m i t t e e . ~ ~  
The full committee, in an action generally viewed as a vic- 
tory for the lobbying efforts of women's  organization^,^' voted by 
a narrow margin to refer the matter to its Equal Opportunities 
Subc~rnmi t t ee .~~  As the end of the &day disapproval period ap- 
proached, that subcommittee held a one-day hearing on the mat- 
ter,73 then recommended that  the full committee reject the 
- - 
(daily ed. June 5, 1975); see 121 CONG. REC. 59713-15 (daily ed.-~une 5, 1975) (remarks of 
Senator Helms). Senator Laxalt introduced a resolution disapproving the sections regulat- 
ing athletic programs. S. CON. RES. 52,94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. S12695 (daily 
ed. July 16, 1975); see 121 CONG. REC. S12695-96 (daily ed. July 16, 1975) (remarks of 
Senator Laxalt.) 
In the House, Representative Martin introduced a broad disapproval resolution, H.R. 
CON. RES. 310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 121 CONG. REC. H5636 (daily ed. June 17, 
1975), and a more narrow resolution focusing solely on athletics, H.R. CON. RES. 311, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Representative O'Hara also introduced a resolution of disapproval 
that is discussed a t  notes 67-74 and accompanying text infra. 
65. See note 64 supra. 
66. The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee had jurisdiction over the Helms 
and Laxalt concurrent resolutions discussed in note 64 supra. Senator Javits, the ranking 
Republican on that committee, told Senator Helms during floor debate on June 6, 1975, 
that the committee intended to act on his resolution by mid-July. See 33 CONK Q .  1298 
(1975). No evidence could be found, however, that the committee ever took any action on 
the matter. 
67. H.R. CON. RES. 330, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (introduced July 8, 1975); w e  
33 CONG. Q.  1484 (1975). 
68. 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 1. 
69. 33 CONG. Q .  1484 (1975). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Hearing on H.R. Con. Res. 330 Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of 
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O'Hara re~olution.~~ No further congressional action followed. On 
July 21, 1975, HEW's title IX regulation became effective. 
B. Scope of HEW's Title IX Reg~ la t ion~~  
HEW'S title IX regulation is divided into five major subparts 
and 43 sections. Only two sections, however, are pertinent to the 
analysis of this comment: the definitional section and the section 
identifying the general coverage of the regulation. 
Central to the ultra vires issue raised by the title IX regula- 
tion are the definitions of "federal financial assistance" and "re- 
cipient." The first term is defined to include not only grants or 
funds extended directly to an institution but also scholarships, 
loans, grants, or funds extended directly to students for payment 
to the in~t i tu t ion .~~ Thus the regulation brings such programs as 
veterans educational benefits'authorized by the G.I. Bill within 
the scope of title IX. The regulation defines "recipient" as any 
entity (1) that receives federal financial assistance from the gov- 
ernment or another recipient and (2) that "operates an education 
program or activity which receives or benefits from such assis- 
t a n ~ e . " ~ ~  This definition is crucial since section 86.11, describing 
coverage, states that the title IX regulation "applies to every 
recipient and to each education program or activity operated by 
such recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial 
assistance ."78 
Although it is nowhere explicit in the regulation, HEW takes 
the position that all education programs and activities of a "re- 
cipient" benefit from federal financial assistance. In other words, 
if any single education program of an institution receives federal 
assistance, all of the programs and activities of the institution, 
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
74. 33 CONG. Q. 1563 (1975). 
75. The discussion in this section is necessarily cursory; emphasis is placed only on 
those provisions treated in Part III of this comment. A more detailed discussion of the 
scope of the regulation appears in a HEW Fact Sheet released simultaneously with the 
final regulation and reprinted a t  OFFICE FOR CNIL RIGHTS, HEW, FINAL TITLE IX REGULA- 
TION IMPLEMENTING EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HEW 
FACT SHEET]. 
The scope of HEW's proposed title IX regulation is discussed in some detail in 
DUNKLE & SANDLER, SEX DISCRIMINATION AGAINST STUDENTS: IMPLICATIONS OF TITLE IX OF 
THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972 (reprinted in 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 
354-77). For a detailed but disapproving examination of the final regulation see 1975 
Hearings on Title IX Regulation 449-521 (memorandum submitted by Senator Helms). 
76. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(g) (1975). 
77. Id. § 86.2(h). 
78. Id. § 86.11 (emphasis added). 
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not just the single program receiving the aid, are subject to the 
regulatory s~herne. '~ HEW stated this view in a memorandum 
released simultaneously with the final regulation: 
79. Both proponents and opponents of the regulation have recognized that HEW's 
approach is institutional rather than programmatic, that is, that if any one program 
receives or benefits from federal financial assistance, the entire institon is subjected to 
regulation. For example, NOW, a supporter of the regulation, made the following com- 
ment on the proposed regulation: 
We have received reports from women around the country that some school 
administrators insist that the only activities covered are specific activities di- 
rectly receiving federal aid (the school lunch program, for example, or a Title I 
ESEA tutoring project). This is a crucial point, since many areas of serious 
discrimination do not directly receive federal aid (athletics, shop, home econom- 
ics, most curriculum materials, and so on). 
On the other hand, HEW staff tell us that an "education program or activ- 
ity" benefitting from federal financial assistance is almost anything that goes 
on in an institution of education. The regulation implies this interpretation, by 
covering athletics, dorm curfews, and the like, but it nowhere states it. 
121 CONG. REC. S772 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1975). 
A university president testifying on the final regulation observed: 
The Regulations seem to provide that if an educational institution has received, 
even indirectly, a single dollar of federal money, every decision, activity, facility, 
educational policy or communication of that institution is subject to review and 
regulation by the Department. 
Sections 86.2 (g) and (h) of the Regulations provide that an institution is a 
"recipient', of "federal financial assistance" even if its receipt of federal assis- 
tance is only indirect or minimal. For example, they would apparently make an 
institution subject to control if it enrolled only one student receiving veteran's 
benefits or attending school under a federal grant or loan. In addition, the 
underlying premise of the Regulations-evident throughout-is that being a 
"recipient" subjects every institutional program or activity to regulation 
whether or not that particular program or activity received federal financial 
assistance. The Department has therefore taken the position that if a college or 
university receives some direct or indirect financial assistance for its department 
of chemistry it must accept government supervision of all of its other academic 
departments, its dormitories, its admissions and financial aids policies, and 
every other aspect of its operations. 
1975 Hearings on Title ZX Regulation 232-33 (prepared statement of Dr. Dallin H. Oaks, 
president, Brigham Young University, and director and secretary of the American Associa- 
tion of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities). 
A memorandum prepared by the American Law Division of the Library of Congress 
for Senator Bayh interpreted the scope of the proposed regulation in a slightly different 
way: 
In short, the proposed regulations arguably reflect a position on the part of the 
agency [HEW] that, for purposes of determining compliance, the educational 
activities of institutional recipients may, where general admissions policies are 
concerned, be viewed as a [sic] individual entity. Where less pervasive forms 
of discrimination are involved, however, the regulations seem to contemplate a 
program by program approach to coverage. 
1975 Hearings on Title ZX Regulation 188. This latter interpretation seems to be fore- 
closed, however, by HEW's own statements. See note 80 and accompanying text infra. 
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Except for the specific limited exemptions set forth below, 
the final regulation applies to all aspects of all education pro- 
grams or activities of a school district, institution of higher edu- 
cation, or other entity which receives Federal funds for any of 
those programs.sn 
HEW apparently bases its position on what may be termed the 
"benefit" theory: Federal financial assistance to one program 
benefits all of the institution's other programs since that 
assistance "releases" institutional funds for use in the other pro- 
g ram~.~ '  
A. Ultra Vires Challenges to Administrative Regulations: In 
General 
Ultra vires, a term normally used only in the law of corpora- 
tions," is employed in this comment as a shorthand reference to 
acts beyond the lawful power of an administrative agency or de- 
partment. Thus, when an agency promulgates rules or regulations 
that extend or modify the authorizing statute, the act is ultra 
vires and, under well-established doctrine, invalid." The Su- 
preme Court has stated the principle in these terms: 
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a 
federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end 
is not the power to make law . . . but the power to adopt regula- 
tions to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the 
statute. A regulation which does not do this, but operates to 
create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.84 
80. HEW FACT SHEET, supra note 75, a t  3 (emphasis added). HEW's Secretary Wein- 
berger repeated this language when testifying on the title IX regulation before Representa- 
tive O'Hara's subcommittee: 
The regulation, briefly, provides as follows: Except for certain limited ex- 
emptions, the final regulation applies to all aspects of all educational programs 
or activities of a school district, institution of higher education, or other entity 
which receives Federal funds for any of those programs. 
1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 438. 
81. The "benefit" theory has often been advanced by proponents of a broad interpre- 
tation of the regulation. See, e.g., 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 171 (prepared 
statement of Senator Bayh); id. a t  387 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandler); Comment, 
Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public 
Schools, 53 TEX. L. REV. 103, 110 (1974). 
82. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1692 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
83. See, e.g., Campbell v. Galeno Chem. Co., 281 U S .  599, 610 (1930); Federal 
Maritime Comm'n v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1964). 
84. Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965), quoting Manhattan General 
Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). 
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The process for resolving an ultra vires challenge to an ad- 
ministrative regulation is deceptively simple to outline. The re- 
viewing court first construes the underlying statute and identifies 
its scope, then repeats this process with the regulation. The scope 
of both statute and regulation are then compared, and aspects of 
the regulation that extend the scope of the statute, if any, are 
declared invalid. In practice, however, proper resolution of such 
challenges can be exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless, unlike the 
delegation doctrine in administrative law, to which only lip serv- 
ice has been paid for the last thirty yearQ5 the ultra vires princi- 
ple is not infrequently applied to invalidate administrative regu- 
l a t i o n ~ . ~ ~  
As noted, courts in resolving an ultra vires challenge must 
construe the authorizing statute. Yet an administrative regula- 
tion itself often serves as an interpretation of the underlying stat- 
ute. Because of the expertise generally ascribed to the promulgat- 
ing agency or department, and perhaps for other more sensitive 
but often unarticulated reasons,s7 courts generally give some de- 
gree of deference to the interpretation embodied in the regula- 
t i ~ n . ~ V h e  degree of deference afforded, however, extends from 
great, or even excessive, to minimal. At the one extreme, courts 
state that they will sustain a regulation unless it is "plainly and 
palpably inconsistent with the governing statute."@ At the other 
85. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 84 (6th ed. 1974). 
A delegation challenge to the title IX regulation may not be completely futile; cer- 
tainly it would not be frivolous. See generally Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575,582- 
87 (1972). A possible delegation challenge to  title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is 
examined and rejected in Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the 
South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42, 49-53 (1967). 
86. See, e.g., FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U S .  284 (1954); Campbell v. 
Galeno Chem. Co., 281 U S .  599 (1930); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed sub. norn. Virginia v. Train, 44 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Jan. 
26, 1976) (No. 75-1050); Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR. REP. DEC. 1105 (4th Cir., Sept. 19, 
1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3417 ( U S .  Jan. 7, 1976) (75-960); Brown v. 
EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3381 ( U S .  Dec. 24,1975) 
(No. 75-909); Vialpando v. Shea, 475 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 416 U S .  251 (1974); 
Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964); 
United States v. Silva, 272 F. Supp. 46 (S.D. Cal. 1967). 
87. A federal court, for example, may hesitate to invalidate the actions of a coequal 
branch of the government, such as the executive branch acting through one of its depart- 
ments or agencies. Or a court may defer to an administrative interpretation out of a 
disinclination to undertake the almost always difficult task of statutory construction. 
88. For an excellent summary of the aspect of judicial deference discussed here see 
1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 187, 190-91 (memorandum from the American Law 
Division of the Library of Congress to Senator Bayh). 
89. E.g., Mt. Vernon Cooperative Bank v. Gleason, 250 F. Supp. 952, 954 (D. Mass. 
1966). See also Jno. McCall Coal Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 689,691-92 (4th Cir. 1967). 
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extreme, courts state that "an inquiry to determine if the agency 
has exceeded its statutory power is a constitutional obligation" 
of the courts, discharge of which "is an exercise of judicial author- 
ity to preserve the legislative scheme."90 Under the latter view, 
little, if any, deference is afforded the agency's interpretationY 
B. Ultra Vires Challenges to the Title IX Regulation 
This comment analyzes the two major ultra vires challenges 
that have been leveled a t  HEW's title IX regulation: (1) By defin- 
ing "federal financial assistance" to include not only federal aid 
paid directly to an educational institution but also federal aid 
paid directly to students who in turn use it to meet education 
expenses at the school of their choice, the regulation goes beyond 
the scope of the statute. (2) By subjecting all programs of an 
institution to HEW regulation if any one program receives or 
benefits from federal financial assistance, the regulation impro- 
perly extends the authorizing statute. If these two challenges are 
sustained, the regulation would need to be extensively modified 
and the quantum of federal agency intervention in many schools 
and universities would be significantly reduced.92 
In analyzing these two major ultra vires challenges, the cru- 
cial inquiry goes to the scope of the authorizing statute, title IX. 
This comment uses standard tools of statutory construction in 
measuring the scope of that statute: (1) the language of the stat- 
ute itself; (2) the interpretation given similar or analogous stat- 
utes, in this case title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and (3) the 
legislative history of the statute, including congressional debate 
on the measure before its enactment. Before analyzing the scope 
of the statute, however, one unusual feature of title IX bearing 
on the ultra vires issues requires consideration. The title IX regu- 
lation was laid before Congress pursuant to section 431(d) of the 
General Education Provisions Act, as amended by the 1974 Edu- 
90. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Benj. Harris & Co., 245 F. Supp. 467, 472 (N.D. 
Ill. 1965). See also Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1074 (5th Cir. 
1969). 
91. See, e.g., Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969); 
Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964); 
United States v. Silva, 272 F. Supp. 46 (S.D. Cal. 1967). 
92. There is a third possible ultra vires challenge of major proportions that alleges 
that title IX grants HEW no authority over employment practices. If such a challenge 
were upheld, it would completely eliminate subpart E of HEW's regulation. This chal- 
lenge is presented a t  1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 406-08 (testimony of Janet 
Kuhn); id. at 521 (memorandum submitted by Senator Helms). 
1331 HEW'S REGULATION 153 
cation Amendments.03 Congress, or at  least some parts of it, re- 
viewed the regulation to determine whether it "is inconsistent 
with the Act from which it derives its authority . . . ."94 That  
fact, coupled with the fact that Congress did not signal with a 
concurrent resolution of disapproval a finding of inconsistency, 
may have a significant impact on judicial review of any ultra vires 
challenges to the regulation. 
I .  The "laying before" procedure 
From 1939 to the present, various statutes have contained a 
"laying before" provision, usually designed to make "administra- 
tive exercise of delegated power subject to congressional approval 
or disapproval by concurrent resolution or simple r e s o l ~ t i o n . " ~ ~  
Congress stated the purpose of the statute requiring HEW to lay 
its title IX regulation before Congress, section 431(d) of the Gen- 
eral Education Provisions Act as amended in 1974,96 in these 
terms: 
The problem which this amendment seeks to meet is the 
steady escalation of agency quasi-legislative power, and the cor- 
responding attrition in the ability of the Congress to make the 
law. For at  least four decades now, the agencies of the Executive 
93. See note 61-74 and accompanying text supra. 
94. General Education Provisions Act § 431(d), 20 U.S.C.A. 8 1232(d) (Supp. 1976). 
95. Cotter & Smith, Administrative Accountability to Congress: The Concurrent 
Resolution, 9 WESTERN POL. Q. 955, 959 (1956). 
For a general history of the "laying before" procedure in the United States see J. 
HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 204-38 (1964). 
The British "laying before" procedure is discussed in detail a t  Boisvert, A Legislative 
Tool for Supervision of Administrative Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 
638, 639-50 (1957). 
Various constitutional attacks have been leveled a t  the "laying before" procedure. 
Commentators opposing the "laying before" procedure on constitutional grounds include 
HARRIS, supra, a t  238-44; Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congres- 
sional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569, 586-87 (1953); Comment, 
Congress Steps Out: A Look a t  Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 
983, 1065-81 (1975). Commentators arguing for the constitutionality of the procedure 
include Boisvert, supra, a t  65x-61; Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules 
and Regulations: The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031, 1042 (1955) (All 
authorities who claim that the "laying before" procedure is unconstitutional, "eminent 
though they may be, are clearly wrong both in their approach to the question of constitu- 
tionality and their answer to it."). 
No American court has yet resolved the constitutional issues. Justice White in a 
concurring opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 44 U.S.L.W. 4127, 4212-13 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1976), 
however, argued that the "laying before" procedure could withstand the most prominent 
constitutional attack leveled a t  it: namely, that the procedure improperly infringes on the 
President's veto power. 
96. 20 U.S.C.A. 8 1232(d) (Supp. 1976). 
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Branch have increasingly used their rule-making authority to 
"correct" what they feel are the errors and ambiguities of the 
law. And for that same four decades, the Congress has, increas- 
ingly, given to those agencies, broader and broader areas of dis- 
cretionary rule-making . 
. . . .  
The Executive Branch, under administrations of both par- 
ties, has eagerly seized authority which Congress, under the 
control of either party, has all too carelessly allowed to slip from 
its hands.%' 
An early advocate of the "laying before" procedure, Professor 
Boisvert, identified the possibility that the "laying before" proce- 
dure may operate to narrow the scope of judicial review of regula- 
tions subjected to ultra vires attacks: 
Legislative participation in rulemaking would be a persu- 
asive indication to reviewing courts of legislative approval of any 
regulation placed before its scrutinizing committee. . . . Such 
legislative participation in agency rulemaking would . . . elimi- 
nate in part the possibility of future voiding of the regulation by 
the courts on an ultra vires basis, since such laying could be 
interpreted as congressional approval of the agency reg~la t ion .~~ 
Professor Boisvert may have overstated the impact of the "laying 
before" procedure on judicial review in his eagerness to promote 
the device, but the central idea of his assertions appears to be 
sound and is supported by some judicial authority? Indeed, a 
97. H.R. REP. NO. 93-805, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1974) (accompanying H.R. 69). 
98. Boisvert, supra note 95, at 665 (footnotes omitted). 
99. When an ultra vires attack on the then new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was 
brought before the United States Supreme Court in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 
(1941), the Court found that the Rules did not go beyond the scope of the statute authoriz- 
ing the Court to promulgate such rules. In support of this holding, the Court argued, inter 
alia: 
Moreoever, in accordance with the [Enabling] Act, the rules were submitted 
to the Congress so that that body might examine them and veto their going into 
effect if contrary to the policy of the legislature [embodied in the Enabling 
Act.] 
The value of the reservation of the power to examine proposed rules, laws 
and regulations before they become effective is well understood by Congress. It 
is frequently, as here, employed to make sure that the action under the delega- 
tion squares with the Congressional purpose. Evidently the Congress felt the 
rule was within the ambit of the statute as no effort was made to eliminate it 
from the proposed body of rules, although this specific rule was attacked and 
defended before the committees of the two Houses. . . . That no adverse action 
was taken by Congress indicates, at least, that no transgression of legislative 
policy was found. We conclude that the rules under attack are within the author- 
ity granted. 
Id. a t  14-16 (footnotes omitted). 
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student commentator reached a similar, though more thoughtful, 
conclusion concerning the impact of the "laying before" proce- 
dure on judicial review. 
The scope of judicial review will probably be narrowed by 
the existence of the laying procedure. . . . [Tlhe effect of con- 
gressional approval would seem . . . to be that of establishing 
a strong presumption that the rule was within the authority of 
the agency, but with an opportunity to establish the contrary. 
Unless congressional consideration became perfunctory, the ef- 
fect of assent should be of considerably greater weight than that 
accorded such supposed expressions of congressional intent as 
renewing without comment the statute on which a regulation is ' 
based. Ion 
This comment identifies two crucial concepts: (1) Congres- 
sional review does not preclude judicial review, and (2) the na- 
ture, or quality, of the congressional review should have a bearing 
on the extent and rigor of subsequent judicial review. The first 
concept appears almost self-evident and needs little elaboration. 
Congressionnal failure to disapprove a regulation laid before it 
cannot protect the regulation from an ultra vires attack; congres- 
sional inaction cannot operate to make a regulation an Act of 
Congress. The regulation remains merely the product of dele- 
gated rulemaking power exercised by an administrative depart- 
ment; as such, the possibility exists that it  exceeds the scope of 
the Act that was passed by Congress and is therefore vulnerable 
to judicial review on ultra vires grounds.lol The second concept is 
more complex than the first, however, and merits elaboration in 
the context of the title IX regulation. 
Certain features of the congressional review of the title IX 
regulation may persuade a court to limit its review of the regula- 
tion. First, a great deal of publicity and public interest sur- 
rounded the laying of the regulation before Congress. Congress 
was not unaware of its opportunity to review the regulation or of 
its power to disapprove it by concurrent resolution. This fact is 
demonstrated by the action of several senators and representa- 
tives in introducing various concurrent resolutions of disap- 
100. Note, "Laying on the Table9'-A Device for Legislative Control Over Delegated 
Powers, 65 HARV. L. REV. 637, 647 (1952) (footnotes omitted). 
101. A British court has held that Parliamentary approval of an administrative regu- 
lation did not protect the regulation from ultra vires challenges in the courts, since the 
approval did not make the regulation an Act of Parliament. Rex v. Electricity Comm'rs, 
119241 1 K.B. 171. 
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proval.lo2 Further, one subcommittee conducted rather extensive 
hearings on the matter and considered therein some of the same 
ultra vires arguments tha t  may eventually be made to the 
courts.lo3 In sum, to use the words of the student commentator 
quoted above, the "congressional consideration" was not "per- 
functory."lo4 
Other features of the congressional review, however, strongly 
suggest that the courts should be cautious not to accord undue 
weight to that review. First, no member of the Senate and only 
few members of the House considered and voted on the merits of 
any of the several concurrent resolutions of disapproval intro- 
duced in Congres~. '~~ This limited review was the result, a t  least 
in part, of the procedural maneuverings of congressional support- 
ers of the regulation designed to delay and thereby prevent review 
on the merits during the relatively short 45-day review period.'"" 
Also in this context, it should be noted that of the two House 
subcommittees that did vote on a resolution of disapproval, the 
subcommittee that conducted the most thorough and extensive 
hearings on the matter, Representative O'Hara's Subcommittee 
on Postsecondary Education, voted to disapprove portions of the 
regulation.lo7 
Second, the regulation came before Congress three years 
after Congress enacted the original title IX legislation.'" The 
Ninety-second Congress enacted title IX; the Ninety-fourth Con- 
gress reviewed the title IX regulation. Undoubtedly there was a 
substantial continuity of membership between the enacting and 
the reviewing Congress. Nevertheless, many congressmen con- 
fronted with the task of reviewing the regulation had no part in 
the enactment of the authorizing statute and thus had no more 
direct access to the intent of Congress in passing title IX than a 
reviewing court will have when considering the same matter.Io9 
102. See note 64 and accompanying text supra. 
103. See 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation. 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has already initiated a suit 
against HEW, challenging the validity of the title IX regulation. The complaint makes 
the same two ultra vires challenges examined in this comment. NCAA v. Mathews, Civil 
No. 76-32-C2 (D. Kan., filed Feb. 17, 1976). 
104. Note, supra note 100, a t  647. 
105. See notes 62-74 and accompanying text supra. 
106. See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra. 
107. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra. 
108. See notes 54, 60-61 and accompanying text supra. 
109. For example, 13 of the 40 members of the House Committee on Education and 
Labor of the Ninety-fourth Congress were not members of the Ninety-second Congress. 
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Also, the three-year delay may have dulled somewhat the recol- 
lection of congressmen engaged in both the enactment of title IX 
and the review of the regulation.ll0 
Third, the limited review of the regulation that did occur was 
not a dispassionate, detached congressional attempt at  legal 
analysis. Congressional review of the regulation was heavily influ- 
enced by political forces. Lobbyists representing feminist inter- 
ests brought substantial pressure to bear ,on congressmen in- 
volved in the review.11' Congressional consideration of the regula- 
tion resembled in many ways the activity that surrounds legisla- 
tive action on a proposed statute.*12 A reviewing court, therefore, 
should not take a t  face value Representative O'Hara's statement 
opening the 1975 hearings that HEW's title IX "regulations will 
be reviewed [by Congress] solely to see if they are consistent 
with the law and with the intent of Congress in enacting the 
law."Il3 Reviewing congressmen were a t  least as concerned with 
measuring the political ramifications of their approval or disap- 
proval of the regulation as they were with measuring the regula- 
tion against the intended scope of title IX. 
In light of the various features of Congress's review of the 
title IX regulation outlined above, a self-imposed limitation, of 
any significant degree, on the scope of judicial review of the regu- 
lation appears inappropriate.l14 
Compare 28 CONG. Q .  ALMANAC 24-25 (1972) (membership roll of the Ninety-second Con- 
gress) with 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation ii (membership roll of the House Com- 
mittee on Education and Labor of the Ninety-fourth Congress). 
110. For example, when Senator Bayh was debating in support of title IX on the floor 
of the Senate, he was asked what types of federal aid might be cut off if a violation 
occurred. He responded that "specific assistance that was being received by individual 
students" would not be cut off. 117 CONG. REC. 30408 (1971). During the 1975 hearings on 
the regulation, Representative Quie queried Bayh on this statement in light of HEW's 
action in bringing direct student assistance within the scope of the term federal financial 
assistance. See 45 C.F.R. 6 86.2(g) (1975). Specifically, Quie wanted to  know whether 
HEW had "overstepped its bounds in claiming that an institution is conducting a program 
or activity financed by the Federal Government if a student is receiving Federal aid to 
attend that program or those programs." Bayh responded: "You know, I just don't know. 
I would have to look that up if you would like . . . ." 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 
181-82. 
111. See, e.g., 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 216 (statement of Lillian 
Hatcher, United Auto Workers (UAW) Women's Dept.) ("A vote against these regulations 
is a vote against the workers the UAW represents."). 
112. The lobbying efforts of feminist groups in support of the regulation have already 
been mentioned. Strong opposition to the regulation came from, among others, the Na- 
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and various college football coaches. See, 
e.g., id. at 46 (Darrel Royal, president, American Football Coaches Ass'n); id. a t  98 (John 
A. Fuzak, president, NCAA). 
113. Id. at 1. 
114. If perspective is yet possible on congressional action reviewing HEW'S title IX 
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2. T h e  definition of ((receivi2g federal financial assistance" 
Title IX prohibits, with certain exceptions, sex discrimina- 
tion in any education program or activity "receiving Federal fin- 
ancial assistance."115 HEW's title IX regulation defines "federal 
financial assistance" to include not only funds paid directly to an 
education institution but also "[s]cholarships, loans, grants, 
wages or other funds extended to any entity for payment to or on 
behalf of students admitted to that entity, or extended directly 
to such students for payment to that entity."llThe question 
arises whether HEW's definition, particularly the provision cov- 
ering direct student aid, exceeds the intended scope of the author- 
izing statute and is thus ultra vires. 
a. T h e  language of the statute. The language of title IX 
suggests two conditions for application of the statute's prohibi- 
tion: (1) an institution must "receive" (2) whatever constitutes 
"federal financial assistance." Focusing for the moment solely on 
the first condition, it seems doubtful that an educational institu- 
tion "receives" federal money paid to a student, such as veterans' 
educational benefits."' HEW apparently perceived this difficulty 
with its definition; in a subsequent definition, that of "recipient," 
regulation, i t  indicates the validity of the following evaluation of the "laying before" 
procedure in general, made 20 years ago by two commentators on the procedure: 
Experience with the concurrent resolution indicates that Congress is more 
imaginative in fashioning tools for checking and influencing the administration 
of delegated powers than it is skillful and determined in employing them to hold 
administrators to clearly defined standards of performance. 
Cotter & Smith, supra note 95, a t  966. 
115. 20 U.S.C. 5 1681(a) (Supp. IV, 1974); note 1 supra. 
116. 45 C.F.R. 5 86.2(g)(l)(ii) (1975). 
117. One commentator on this issue stated: 
Since the language of Title IX speaks in terms of "receiving Federal finan- 
cial assistance," it is useful to consider the meaning of the term "receiving." 
Realizing that this term has historically been employed in the drafting of legisla- 
tion, in addition to its wide use throughout the law, the commentator believes 
that recourse to a more legalistic definition is appropriate (although application 
of the common, customary definition as contained in Webster would render the 
same result). Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 74, "Receive," page 643, provides 
that ". . . 'receiving' necessarily implies consenting to receive, and that there 
is a receiving whenever there is a change of possession, as when one parts with 
the control of a thing and another takes and accepts it." Clearly, the act of 
"receiving" occurs and is completed when one entity delivers possession of a 
thing to another entity, which accepts it. There is no basis for believing that 
Congress intended by the enactment of Title IX that the meaning of this term 
should be extended so as to indirectly encompass remote benefits to some pro- 
gram or activity separate from the education program or activity to which the 
Federal financial assistance is given. 
1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 508 (memorandum submitted by Senator Helms). 
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HEW provided that the regulation applies to an entity "which 
operates an education program or activity which receives or 
benefits from [federal financial] assistance . . . ."l18 A persua- 
sive argument can be made that a school indeed benefits when 
it qualifies to enroll students receiving, for example, veterans' 
educational benefits or federally guaranteed loans.lIg HEW'S use 
of the term benefits, however, is too facile a solution to its prob- 
lem. Title IX, by its own language, extends only to programs that  
"receive" federal financial assistance. By superadding the 
broader, more inclusive term benefits to the language of the stat- 
ute, thus permitting inclusion of direct federal aid to students in 
the definition of federal financial assistance, HEW undoubtedly 
extended the scope of the statute and, unless the Department has 
access to other saving arguments, rendered its regulation vulnera- 
ble to ultra vires challenges.120 
b. The legislative history. The legislative history bearing on 
the scope and definition of "federal financial assistance" in title 
IX consists of only one statement by the sponsor of the Senate 
version of the measure, Senator Bayh. During debate on the mea- 
sure, Senator Dominick asked what type of federal aid could be 
terminated for a violation of title IX.121 This question can be read 
as going to the scope of the term federal financial assistance since 
the "assistance" federal departments or agencies may terminate, 
under the authority of title IX's second section, is obviously the 
same assistance termed "federal financial assistance" throughout 
other portions of the statute.ln Senator Bayh responded initially 
that "all aid that comes through the Department of Health, Edu- 
cation, and Welfare" could be terminated. 123 He then qualified his 
answer, however, with these words: "It is unquestionable, in my 
judgment, that this [termination] would not be directed a t  spe- 
cific assistance that was being received by individual students, 
118. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (1975) (emphasis added). 
119. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 601-04 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd 
mem., No. 72-2164 (4th Cir., May 28, 1975); notes 129-133 and accompanying text infra. 
120. For a more detailed discussion of the issues treated in this subsection see 1975 
Hearings on Title IX Regulation 499,507-08 (memorandum submitted by Senator Helms). 
121. 117 CONG. REC. 30408 (1971). 
122. See notes 1-2 supra. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. IVY 1974), the section of title IX 
providing for federal administrative enforcement, uses the full term Federal financial 
assistance initially; twice thereafter in the section, the shorthand term assistance is used. 
123. 117 CONG. REC. 30408 (1971). 
At the time of his response, Senator Bayh's bill directed only HEW and not all federal 
departments and agencies to effectuate the sex discrimination prohibition through regula- 
tions and, if necessary, fund termination. See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra. 
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but would be directed a t  the institution . . . . "124 
On its face, the Senator's response supports the conclusion 
that direct aid to students was intended to be left outside the 
scope of the term federal financial assistance. Supporters of the 
regulation, however, may argue that Senator Bayh's comment is 
not inconsistent with the regulation's inclusion of direct student 
aid within the definition of that term. The regulation provides 
that when a school violates title IX it may be denied the right to 
enroll students receiving federal aid, such as veterans' educa- 
tional benefits. But since the individual student's right to receive 
those benefits continues if he or she matriculates at  a qualifying 
school, the termination is not "directed a t  specific assistance that 
was being received by individual students." Only if the student 
elects-for personal, professional, educational, or religious rea- 
sons-to commence or continue at  a school not in compliance 
with the regulation will his or her federal assistance be termi- 
nated. 125 
This last argument-that termination would be the result of 
a personal decision and not the result of HEW'S title IX regula- 
tion-is at best only partially satisfactory. If a federal agency or 
- - 
124. Id. The pertinent portion of the dialogue reads: 
Mr. Dominick. What type of aid the recipient might be getting would be 
cut off? Let us suppose, for example, that they have guaranteed loans for con- 
struction. Let us suppose that they have research grants under the NIH. Let us 
suppose that they are doing graduate work in some programs authorized by the 
Defense Department. Just what type of aid are we cutting off here? 
Mr. Bayh. We are cutting off all aid that comes through the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare, and as to the specific ones, the Senator has 
mentioned, I think they would all be included with the exception of research 
grants made through other departments such as the Department of Defense. 
Mr. Dominick. The Senator is talking about every program under HEW? 
Mr. Bayh. Let me suggest that I would imagine that  any person who was 
sitting at the head of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, ad- 
ministering this program, would be reasonable and would use only such leverage 
as was necessary against the institution. 
It is unquestionable, in my judgment, that this would not be directed a t  
specific assistance that was being received by individual students, but would be 
directed at the institution, and the Secretary would be expected to use good 
judgment as to how much leverage to apply, and where i t  could best be applied. 
125. Seegenerally Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd 
mem., No. 74-2164 (4th Cir., May 28, 1975); notes 129-133 and accompanying text infra. 
In the Bob Jones case, the court upheld administrative action terminating, under title VI, 
the right of eligible veterans seeking an education a t  the university to receive veterans' 
educational benefits. It was clear from the decision that an otherwise eligible veteran 
could requalify for benefits by matriculating a t  an eligible school. Also, the order of 
termination was prospective only; already enrolled veterans could continue receiving ben- 
efits until completion of their studies. 
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department terminated direct student aid following a student's 
decision to matriculate at  a noncomplying school, the legal basis 
for the action would be title IX, as construed by the regulation. 
Title IX, in other words, would be employed to terminate "spe- 
cific assistance that was being received by individual students," 
contrary to the assurance of Senator Bayh that the statute would 
not be used in that manner.126 
In conclusion, the legislative history bearing on the definition 
of federal financial assistance indicates that Congress intended 
that no direct federal aid to individual students be terminated 
solely by operation of title IX. The legislative history is less con- 
clusive when such termination results from both title IX sanc- 
tions directed at  an institution and the personal decision of a 
federally assisted student to continue or commence his or her 
education a t  a noncomplying school. On its face, Senator Bayh's 
assurance permits not even contingent termination-that is, ter- 
mination in the latter situation-of funds under title IX. If the 
statement is thus read, i t  indicates a congressional intent as 
broad as that defined above: Title IX is not to be used, directly 
or indirectly, to terminate federal aid to individual students. The 
regulation's inclusion of direct aid to students within the defini- 
tion of federal financial assistance may, indeed is likely to, oper- 
ate in contravention of that intent .I2' 
c. T h e  interpretation of title VI of  the  Civil Rights Act of  
1964. Administrative regulations and federal court decisions 
construing and applying title VI of the Civil Rights cannot 
be applied automatically in the title IX context, for reasons dis- 
cussed below. Nevertheless, because of the similarity between 
title VI and title IX, regulations and court decisions construing 
the former must necessarily be persuasive and influential author- 
126. See note 124 supra. 
127. Senator Bayh, in a letter to Senator Pel1 answering questions raised by a univer- 
sity president that was made a part of the record prior to enactment of title IX, stated 
that "the provisions of my amendment in question are parallel to those found in [title VI 
of the] 1964 Civil Rights Act. Since 1964, there has been ample opportunity to establish 
enforcement procedure with respect to discrimination on the basis of race; enforcement 
of my amendment will draw heavily on these precedents." 118 CONG. REC. 18437 (1972). 
Proponents of the regulation may argue that this and similar statements reveal a 
congressional intent to construe title IX as broadly as title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
It should be remembered, however, that at the time of enactment of title IX, title VI had 
not been applied to terminate federal aid paid directly to students. That broader applica- 
tion only came later. See notes 129-133 and accompanying text infra. Indeed, as late as 
the 1975 hearings on HEW'S title IX regulation, Senator Bayh appears to have been 
unaware of such an application of title VI. See note 110 supra. 
128. 42 U.S.C. $ 9  200Od to d-6 (1970). 
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ity in the construction of the latter. Indeed, the strongest support 
for HEW's broad definition of "receiving federal financial assis- 
tance" comes from title VI regulations and cases. 
The most important title VI case supporting HEW's position 
is Bob Jones University v. Johnson.12g In that case, an administra- 
tive law judge of HEW, following an evidentiary hearing, issued 
an order terminating the right of eligible veterans to receive veter- 
ans' educational benefits while enrolled a t  Bob Jones University. 
The judge based the order on the university's refusal to admit 
unmarried blacks and otherwise to comply with the VA's 
regulation implementing title VI.130 The VA approved and en- 
forced the order.131 
The university and an eligible veteran desiring to attend the 
university sought injunctive relief in federal district court to 
block the VA's action. The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, 
that the university did not receive federal financial assistance, as 
that term is used in title VI, and was therefore not subject to 
either title VI's prohibition or its ~anc t i0ns . l~~  The federal district 
court dismissed the complaint, holding that the university re- 
ceived federal financial assistance within the scope of title VI 
when it enrolled students receiving veterans' educational bene- 
fits. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision 
per curiam. 133 
The holding of the district court is obviously based on a 
broad construction of "receiving federal financial assistance," one 
that includes federal aid paid directly to students. That construc- 
tion is based in turn on the view that "all that is necessary for 
Title VI purposes is a showing that the infusion of federal money 
through payments to veterans assists the education program of 
the approved school."134 In the Bob Jones case, the court found 
the requisite assistance or benefit in two facts: (1) But for the 
federal payment of veterans' benefits to qualifying students, the 
university would spend its own funds-through scholarships, 
129. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., No. 74-2164 (4th Cir., May 28,1975). 
130. Specifically, the university refused to sign an assurance of compliance with title 
VI required by the VA's title VI regulation, 38 C.F.R. 8 18.4 (1975), as a condition of 
federal assistance. 396 F. Supp. at 599. 
131. The order was prospective only. Already enrolled veterans were permitted to 
continue receiving veterans' educational benefits during the duration of their studies. 396 
F. Supp. at 599. 
132. Id. at 601-02. 
133. No. 74-2164 (4th Cir., May 28, 1975). 
134. 396 F. Supp. at 603 n.22 (emphasis added). 
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grants, and loans-to assist those students.13"2) But for the 
availability of the federal funds, many veterans would not enroll 
a t  the university. Thus, the availability of the funds "benefits the 
school by enlarging the pool of qualified applicants upon which 
it can draw for its education program."136 
Obviously, these two "benefits" identified by the court are 
attenuated. As a practical matter, however, federal assistance, 
and hence federal involvement, may range from direct and sub- 
stantial to minimal and highly attenuated. Thus the courts are 
confronted with a difficult task of line drawing: At what point 
does the federally-conferred "benefit" become so attentuated 
that it no longer constitutes "federal financial assistance" within 
the meaning of title VI? Some courts have taken the position that 
such indirect benefits as those flowing from tax deductions and 
exemptions fall within the scope of title VI,13' or constitute "state 
action" for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment purposes.138 But no 
clear and definitive guidelines for resolution of the line-drawing 
issue have yet been articulated. Hence, the possibility exists that 
the attenuated, indirect "benefits" identified by the court in Bob 
Jones will not qualify as "federal financial assistance" or "state 
action" under standards yet to be devised. 
Assuming, however, that the court in Bob Jones correctly 
resolved the line-drawing issue, the question remains whether the 
underpinnings of that case's broad construction of title VI are 
applicable to title IX. Three identifiable underpinnings emerge 
from the court's opinion. First, it would be incongruous to draw 
a distinction between payments received directly by the univer- 
sity and payments received by the veteran since the beneficial 
effect of the university is the same under either method of trans- 
mittal. "[Tlhe payments ultimately reach the same beneficiar- 
ies and the benefit to a university would be the same in either 
event." 139 Second, the language and legislative history of title VI 
135. Id. at 602-03. 
136. Id. at 603. 
The court apparently failed to recognize that this second "benefit," while arguably 
"federal" and "assistance," is not essentially "financial." The benefit is educational in a 
qualitative sense. 
137. E . g . ,  McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge 
court). 
138. E.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1151 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd 
mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). It is as yet unclear whether a finding 
of "federal financial assistance" for title VI purposes and a finding of "state action" for 
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment purposes are based on the same standard. 
139. 396 F. Supp. at 603. 
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revealed no congressional intent to exempt veterans' benefits 
from the scope of the statute.lq0 Finally, since federal participa- 
tion in or support of even private racially discriminatory conduct 
is unc~nst i tu t ional ,~~ the court adopted a broad construction of 
title VI, including the phrase "receiving federal financial assis- 
tance," to avoid raising questions concerning the constitution- 
ality of the grant statutes.lq2 
The first underpinning cannot bear close scrutiny in either 
the title VI or the title IX context. It  is true that if tuition pay- 
ments constitute a benefit, there may be little practical signifi- 
cance to the identity of the immediate recipient, whether the 
university or the veteran who in turn pays the funds to the univer- 
sity to meet tuition costs. But under the analysis of the Bob Jones 
court itself, the actual payment of tuition fees does not constitute 
the requisite benefit. Rather, all the "benefits" identified by the 
court flow from the fact that the school qualifies to enroll feder- 
ally assisted veterans.lq3 The payment of tuition fees must be 
viewed as merely a quid pro quo transaction. This is demon- 
strated by the approach taken in HEW'S title IX regulation where 
exchanges between a university and the federal government for 
fair market value are expressly left outside the scope of "federal 
financial assistance. "Iq4 
Strong arguments also appear that when the second and 
third underpinnings are transferred from the context of title VI 
140. Id. at 604 ("Nothing in the congressional debate on what became the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 compels exclusion of these [veterans' benefits] statutes from Title VI 
coverage."). 
141. The court stated: 
Another dimension as to the federal government's Fifth Amendment res- 
ponsibilities exists here. If this court were to hold that the VA payments to 
veterans do not constitute assistance to Bob Jones, it might be contended that 
the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government's payments to veterans attend- 
ing the university. Each time the VA approves an application for benefits to be 
used at Bob Jones, it extends a benefit to whites which it cannot grant to some 
blacks. While this is an outcome of private discrimination, it is clear that no 
[not?] only is the government prohibited from authoring state sponsored dis- 
crimination, it is also prohibited from acquiescence in the discriminatory prac- 
tices of public and private entities which participate in the federal program. 
It is . . . axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or promote 
private persons to accomplish what it  is constitutionally forbidden to accom- 
plish. 
Id. a t  608 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
142. The court felt that it "should avoid a statutory interpretation which raises 
constitutional questions if there is a reasonable reading of the statute which does not raise 
those issues." Id. 
143. See notes 135-136 and accompanying text supra. 
144. 45 C.F.R. 4 86.2(g)(2), (4) (1975). 
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(racial discrimination in general) to the context of title IX (sex 
discrimination in education) they lose much of their validity and 
persuasive force. The court stated, as the second underpinning for 
its holding, that the legislative history of title VI revealed no 
congressional intent to leave veterans' educational benefits out- 
side the scope of the statute. Yet, as discussed above, the legisla- 
tive history of title IX tends to indicate that Congress intended 
federal aid paid directly to individual students, and this would 
include veterans' educational benefits, to be excluded from the 
scope of that statute.145 
The applicability of the third underpinning to title IX is a 
more complex issue. The federal government is as undoubtedly 
barred by the Fifth Amendment from aiding or participating in 
unconstitutional sex discrimination as i t  is from aiding 
unconstitutional racial discriminati0n.l" Yet under currently 
applied constitutional doctrine, virtually all racial discrimina- 
tion, where the requisite government involvement is present and 
where minority races are denied rather than accorded the benefits 
of the discrimination, is uncon~t i tu t iona l .~~~  At the same time, 
many forms of sex-based discrimination are not constitutionally 
infirm.148 These disparate consequences flow from the United 
States Supreme Court's treatment of race as a "suspect classifi- 
cation" in Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
analysis,149 coupled with its refusal to accord the same treatment 
to sex-based or sex-related classif i~ations.~~~ 
145. See notes 121-127 and accompanying text supra. 
146. Compare Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (race) and Simkins v. Moses 
H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963)' cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964) 
(race) with Fronteiro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex). 
147. For a review of the United States Supreme Court's treatment of race discrimina- 
tion, see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL L W 690-753 (9th ed. 1975). 
148. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 US.  57 
(1961); Leighton v. Goodman, 311 F. Supp. 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. St. 
Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimi- 
nation by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675 (1971). 
149. See note 147 supra. 
150. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). But cf.  Fronteiro v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
While sex-based classifications are not treated as inherently suspect, as are racial 
classifications, neither are they accorded the wide deference the courts generally accord 
nonracial classifications under the "rational basis" test, the lower tier of the traditional 
two-tiered equal protection model. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolv- 
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1972). Rather, the Supreme Court now appears to apply an intermediate test to 
sex-based classifications, one that in its rigor falls somewhere between minimal scrutiny 
and strict scrutiny. A sex-based classification, in order to withstand this intermediate 
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An additional difference separates racial discrimination from 
sex-based discrimination. The courts have, either expressly or 
implicitly, treated elimination of the former as a national priority 
of the highest order.151 Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to 
say that the interest in eliminating racial discrimination, as the 
highest national priority, must prevail over all other interests 
when a conflict is ~navoidab1e.l~~ Elimination of sex-based dis- 
crimination, although increasingly important as a national goal, 
has not yet been identified as a priority of the same stature.15J 
Unless and until the proposed Equal Rights Amendment is rati- 
fied, it remains unlikely that the interest in eliminating sex-based 
discrimination will be judicially vaulted over other interests that 
must necessarily, in varying contexts, conflict with that interest. 
The difficult questions that remain are whether and how these 
identifiable differences between the legal status of racial discrim- 
ination and the legal status of sex-based discrimination should 
affect the application of title VI cases such as Bob Jones Univer- 
sity u. Johnson154 to the construction of title IX. 
The court indicated in Bob Jones that federal assistance to 
or participation in, even indirectly, racially discriminatory con- 
duct would be unconstitutional as violative of Fifth Amendment 
guarantees? That assertion, however, remains valid only where 
the discrimination itself, once the requisite government involve- 
ment is identified, is constitutionally impermissible.'" But as 
level of scrutiny, " 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground 
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to  the object of the legislation . . . .' " 
Reed v. ~ e ' e d ,  404 U.S. 71, 76 (197l)(quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 
415 (1920)). 
151. See, e.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1167 (D.D.C.)(three-judge 
court), aff 'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Bob Jones Univ. v. 
Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 607-08 (D.S.C. 1974), aff 'd mem., No. 74-2164 (4th Cir., May 
28, 1975). 
152. Judge Leventhal, speaking for a three-judge district court, stated: 
There is a compelling as well as a reasonable government interest in the 
interdiction of racial discrimination which stands on highest constitutional 
ground, taking into account the provisions and penumbra of the Amendments 
passed in the wake of the Civil War. That government interest is dominant over 
other constitutional interests to the extent that there is complete and unavoid- 
able conflict. 
Green v. Connally, 330 I?. Supp. 1150, 1167 (D.D.C.), aff 'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 
404 U.S. 997 (1971). 
153. Compare Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (sex) with Green v. County School 
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (race) and Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), afd 
mem. sub norn. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (race). 
154. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., No. 74-2164 (4th Cir., May 28,1975). 
155. Id. at 608. 
156. See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); 
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noted above, virtually all racial discrimination is unconstitu- 
tional.'" Thus a court would perhaps be justified in the racial 
context in giving a broad definition, as the Bob Jones court did, 
to "receiving federal financial assistance" in order to avoid rais- 
ing questions concerning the constitutionality of federal grant 
statutes.158 If, however, as is much more likely with sex-based 
discrimination, the assisted discriminatory conduct can pass con- 
stitutional the federal assistance cannot be inter- 
dicted, and the reason for an all-encompassing view of what con- 
stitutes federal assistance disappears. Thus, to the extent a stat- 
ute or regulation is promulgated or employed to interdict consti- 
tutionally permissable discrimination-as are, to a large extent, 
title IX and HEW's title IX regulation160-a primary reason lead- 
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 
376 U.S. 938 (1964); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge 
court). 
157. See note 147 and accompanying text supra. 
158. See notes 141-142 supra. 
159. See notes 148-150 and accompanying text supra. 
160. Speaking of title IX, HEW has stated that "[wlhen Congress specifically pro- 
hibits certain discrimination by statute, a higher standard may well apply than under the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Letter from Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of HEW, to Repre- 
sentative James G. O'Hara, July 2, 1975, in 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 486-89. 
Much of the conduct prohibited by HEW'S title IX regulation, even assuming the 
requisite government involvement, could pass constitutional muster. It is doubtful, for 
example, that a court would intervene on constitutional grounds in a university's decision 
to provide-in the form of additional police surveillance, locks, or lighting-greater secu- 
rity for women's dorms than is provided for men's facilities. The regulation, however, 
prohibits such discriminatory conduct. 45 C.F.R. § 86.32(a) (1975). Also, the regulation 
interdicts the following practices that appear either sufficiently related rationally to a 
valid objective or sufficiently removed from actual sex discrimination to avoid invalida- 
tion on Fifth Amendment grounds: assigning students in a college of education to a 
student-teaching experience a t  an elementary or secondary school that treats the student- 
teacher in a manner inconsistent with any portion of HEW's regulation, id. $ 86.31(d); 
failing to insure that companies interviewing and recruiting on campus are not tainted 
by sexist hiring practices, id. 4 86.38(a); providing sex education courses for college under- 
graduates on a sex-segregated basis, id. $ 86.34(e); failing to establish formal grievance 
procedures for complaints of sex discrimination, id. § 86.8; using a sex-based quota system 
to insure that an equal number of men and women are enrolled in a ballroom dance class, 
id. § 86.34; failing to insure, if the university lists off-campus housing as a service to its 
students, that the housing available to one sex is comparable in quantity and quality to 
the housing available to the other sex, id. 5 86.32(c). 
It should be noted in this context that HEW's regulation to implement title VI, 
particularly the regulation's prohibition of discrimination and segregation in education, 
has been viewed by the courts as coextensive with constitutional prohibitions. See United 
States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 848 (5th Cir. 1966), decree 
corrected, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) ("HEW'S stan- 
dards are substantially the same as this Court's standards. They are required by the 
Constitution . . . ."). This is in contrast to HEW's Title IX regulation, which in many 
areas extends beyond constitutional prohibitions. Again, this difference in the title VI 
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ing a court to construe federal assistance broadly in order to avoid 
the possibility of Fifth Amendment violations is not applicable. 
The above analysis focuses primarily on one of the two iden- 
tified differences between racial and sex-based discrimination: 
the larger scope constitutionally permitted the latter. Analysis of 
the impact of the second difference-the relatively higher priority 
accorded the interest in elimination of racial discrimination-is 
discussed in conjunction with other considerations in section 
III,B,4 below. Analysis of the first difference, however, indicates 
that the reason leading courts to construe title VI broadly, includ- 
ing the language "receiving federal financial assistance," does not 
to an indefinite but perhaps substantial extent apply to title IX. 
d. Implications of HEWS definition of "receiving federal 
financial assistance. " If HEW's broad definition of "receiving 
federal financial assistance" is sustained against the first ultra 
vires challenge, arguably every program of any educational insti- 
tution enrolling students receiving federal aid or benefits will be 
subject to HEW regulation. This is so even i f  the second ultra 
vires challenge-that title IX was drafted to regulate specific 
programs and not entire institutions-prevails and HEW's regu- 
latory scheme is modified accordingly. The reason for this broad 
impact can be readily outlined. A student receiving veterans' 
educational benefits, for example, uses a portion of those benefits 
to meet tuition costs. Tuition payments enter the general fisc of 
the university; from there the money is used to support the uni- 
versity's diverse programs and activities. Thus, every program 
supported by tuition payments of students can be viewed as re- 
ceiving federal financial assistance. Consequently, only those pro- 
grams-revenue-producing intercollegiate athletics a t  some 
colleges, for example161--not receiving tuition funds would remain 
free from federal intervention under the title IX regu1ati0n.l~~ 
regulation and the title IX regulation probably results from the different constitutional 
standards applied to sex-based and racial discrimination. See notes 146-153 and accompa- 
nying text supra. 
161. Testifying in the 1975 hearings, one coach explained: 
[EJach school is somewhat different in the athletic property they own. At the 
University of Illinois anything that is owned by the Athletics Association, which 
is a complete and separate corporation from the university, has been paid for 
100 percent in one of two ways-either by revenue raised by sports or by contri- 
butions from interested alumni. 
1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 54 (testimony of Bob Blackman, University of 
Illinois). 
162. HEW has adopted the position outlined here. Letter from Caspar Weinberger, 
Secretary of HEW, to Representative James G. O'Hara, July 2, 1975, in 1975 Hearings 
on Title IX Regulation 486-89. 
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3. Institutional us. programmatic application of title IX  and 
the title IX regulation 
HEW'S title IX regulation, as has been noted above, prohib- 
its sex discrimination in all programs or activities of an educa- 
tional institution if any one of those programs receives or benefits 
from federal financial assistance.Ifi3 In short, its approach is insti- 
tutional, not programmatic, with the regulation imposing more or 
less specific mandatory guidelines and prohibitions on programs 
that traditionally do not receive federal funding such as athlet- 
ics,'" housing,1B5 health services,'" and scholarship administra- 
tion.'" The ultra vires issue is thus whether HEW exceeded the 
scope of title IX and its authority thereunder when it sought to 
regulate entire educational institutions rather than only those 
specific programs and activities receiving federal financial assis- 
tance. 
a. The language of the statute. Both the language of the 
statute and the way in which that language was chosen tend to 
indicate that Congress intended title IX to be applied on a pro- 
grammatic, not an institutional, basis. The statute's prohibition 
is limited on its face: It extends only to any "education program 
or activity."Ifi8 Further, one remedy provided for enforcement of 
the prohibition-fund termination-must, pursuant to statutory 
mandates, be "limited in its effect to the particular program, or 
part thereof," in which discrimination is found.lBg Also, it seems 
that had Congress desired to prohibit sex discrimination through- 
out an entire institution, i t  could have readily found its way to 
the word institution or recipient in its drafting efforts. Indeed, in 
another section of title IX, one dealing with discrimination 
against the blind, Congress used such language, clearly revealing 
an intent to cover entire institutions: "No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of blindness . . . be denied admission 
in any course of study by a recipient of Federal financial assis- 
tance for any education program or activity . . . . "170 
Also, when drafting the sex discrimination provisions, Con- 
gress had before it bills obviously extending to entire institutions. 
- - -  
163. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra. 
164. 45 C.F.R. 4 86.41 (1975). 
165. Id. § 86.32. 
166. Id. 4 86.39. 
167. Id. 4 86.37. 
168. 20 U.S.C. 4 1681 (Supp. IV, 1974); note 1 supra. 
169. 20 U.S.C. 4 1682 (Supp. IV, 1974); note 2 supra. 
170. 20 U.S.C. 4 1684 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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Of the three measures introduced in Congress prohibiting sex 
discrimination in education-Senator Bayh's original amend- 
ment ,171 the Nixon administration bill, and Representative 
Green's rnea~urel~~-the first two were drafted to cover entire in- 
stitutions.17' Only Representative Green's measure, the measure 
adopted by Congress, limited the scope of the prohibition to an 
"education program or activity."175 Given the alternatives that 
were presented to it, Congress's selection of the more narrowly 
drawn measure lends strong support to the view that Congress 
intended to limit the application of title IX  to programs rather 
than extend it to entire institutions. 
6. The legislative history. As with the legislative history 
pertaining to the first major ultra vires challenge, the legislative 
history relevant to a determination of the second challenge is 
sparse. Unfortunately, it is also ambiguous and inconclusive. The 
following dialogue between Representatives Waggoner and 
Steiger and Representative Green, the author and floor manager 
in the House of the measure that became title IX, constitutes the 
only portion of the congressional debate directly pertinent to the 
scope of the sex discrimination ~roh ib i t i0n . l~~  
Mr. Waggonner. Let me clarify a little bit better the point 
I am trying to make and that is this: This [title] applies, appar- 
ently, only to those programs wherein the Federal Government 
is in part or in whole financing a program or an activity? 
Mrs. Green of Oregon. With Federal funds. 
Mr. Waggonner. That is what I mean, Federal funds. 
Mrs. Green of Oregon. It is really the same as the Civil 
Rights Act in terms of race. 
171. Amendment 398 to S. 659,92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 30156-57 (1971). 
172. H.R. 5191, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
173. H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
174. Sen. Bayh's measure prohibited sex discrimination in "any program or activity 
conducted by a public institution of higher education, or any school or department of 
graduate education, which is a recipient of Federal financial assistance for any education 
program or activity . . . ." Amendment 398 to S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. 
REC. 30156-57 (1971). The administration bill prohibited sex discrimination by a "recipi- 
ent of Federal financial assistance for any education program or activity . . . ." H.R. 
5191, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
175. H.R. 7248,92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); see note 37 and accompanying text supra. 
176. Senator Bayh made the following comment on the floor of the Senate concerning 
his proposed bill, but since the comment is little more than a paraphrase of the language 
of the bill, its illuminative value is marginal a t  best: "The effect of termination of funds 
is limited to the particular entity and program in which such noncompliance has been 
found . . . ." 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972). 
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Mr. Steiger of Wisconsin. . . . 
. . a .  
Mr. Chairman, let me proceed along the line of the gentle- 
man from Louisiana, and let me ask the gentlewoman from 
Oregon (Mrs. Green) for clarification on what I thought I heard. 
In title [IX] the gentleman from Louisiana asked relating 
to a program on [or?] activities receiving Federal financial as- 
sistance, and under the "program on [or?] activity" one could 
not discriminate. That is not to be read, am I correct, that it is 
limited in terms of its application, that is title [IX], to only 
programs that are federally financed? For example, are we say- 
ing that if in the English department they receive no funds from 
the Federal Government that therefore that  program is exempt? 
Mrs. Green of Oregon. If the gentleman will yield, the an- 
swer is in the affirmative. Enforcement is limited to each entity 
or institution and to each program and activity. Discrimination 
would cut off all program funds within an institution.I7' 
Representative Green's response-"With Federal funds." 
-to Representative Waggonner's inquiry may be read as an af- 
firmative response with a clarification, in which case the state- 
ment would be indicative of a congressional intent that title IX 
apply only on a programmatic basis. Such a reading is plausible 
but  not absolutely required. Representative Steiger's attempt 
to clarify the issue would have been helpful but for an unfortun- 
ate phrasing of his queries. I t  should be noted that he asks two 
questions. An affirmative answer to the first would indicate an 
institutional application; an affirmative answer to the second, a 
programmatic approach. Representative Green answered in the 
affirmative, but it is not clear to which of the two questions she 
is responding. The statement following that  response-"En- 
forcement is limited to each entity or institution and to each 
program and activity."-tends to indicate that Representative 
Green was thinking in terms of programmatic application. Yet 
the sentence immediately following-"Discrimination would 
cut off all program funds within an institution."-points in turn 
towards an institutional application. 
The portion of the dialogue immediately following this ex- 
change, however, only brings confusion to an area not yet clari- 
fied: 
Mr. Steiger of Wisconsin. So that the effect of title [IX] 
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is to, in effect, go across the board in terms of the cutting off of 
funds to an institution that would discriminate, is that correct? 
Mrs. Green of Oregon. The purpose of title [IX] is to end 
discrimination in all institutions of higher education, yes, across 
the board, but we do have the three exemptions to which I 
referred.178 
Representative Green's response, which gives wide scope to the 
fund termination remedy, is puzzling in light of the provisions of 
her bill limiting the effect of termination to the "particular pro- 
gram, or part thereof," in which discrimination is found.I7% any 
event, both Representative Steiger's final query and Representa- 
tive Green's response may be read as revealing a congressional 
preference for an institutional application of the statute. Never- 
theless, consideration of the dialogue in toto leads one to no con- 
clusion other than that the relevant legislative history is hope- 
lessly ambiguous. 
c. Interpretation of title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
Both proponents and opponents of HEW'S title IX regulation 
resort to a crucial Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case construing 
title VI, Board of Public Instruction v. Finch,IR0 in support of their 
respective positions on the scope of the application of title IX. 
The case, therefore, merits consideration in some detail? 
Over a period of several years, from 1965 to 1968, a small 
segregated Florida school district and HEW engaged in negotia- 
tions in an effort to arrive a t  an acceptable desegregation plan for 
the school district. The pace of progress was slow, however; the 
faculties and studentries of the schools in the district remained 
racially segregated. Finally HEW broke off the negotiations as 
fruitless and commenced administrative proceedings under title 
VI. An HEW hearing examiner found that the school district's 
progress toward student and faculty desegregation was "inade- 
quate" and therefore entered an order terminating "any classes 
of Federal financial assistance" administered by HEW and two 
other federal agencies. HEW adopted the order. lR2 
The order was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
178. Id. 
179. See id. at 39098-99. 
180. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). 
181. For an instance where opponents of the regulation resort to the Finch case see 
19x5 Hearing on Title IX Regulation 242, 245 (prepared statement of American Associa- 
tion of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities). HEW cites the Finch case 
in the comments accompanying the final title IX regulation. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975). 
182. 414 F.2d at 1070-71. 
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where two major issues were presented for review: (1) whether 
HEW's blanket termination of federal funds, coupled with a fail- 
ure to make programmatically oriented findings of discrimina- 
tion, violated section 602 of title VI, a section virtually indentical 
to section 902 of title IX; and (2) whether that issue was properly 
cognizable on appeal since it had not been raised in the adminis- 
trative hearing below.IR3 
In order to resolve the procedural issue, the circuit court felt 
compelled to examine in part the substance of HEW's action. I t  
noted that since the school district received federal funds under 
three separate federal grant statutes, a possibility existed that the 
school district operated one or more of those programs on a non- 
discriminatory basis and that such a program was not tainted by 
discrimination in other federally funded acti~ities.'~VI'he court 
felt that it could not "assume, contrary to the express mandate 
of [section 602 of title VIJ, that defects in one part of a school 
system automatically infect the whole."IR5 The congressional in- 
tent expressed in section 602 was that the effect of fund termina- 
tion be limited, or "pinpointed," to programs operated discrimi- 
natorily in f a ~ t . ~ ~ ~ e c a u s e  the "action of HEW in the proceedings 
below was clearly disruptive of the legislative scheme" and be- 
cause of other defects in HEW's administration of the title VI 
sanction, the court felt compelled to proceed to the merits and 
resolve the first issue. IR7 
On the merits, the court refused to permit HEW to treat a 
program as not in compliance with title VI, and thus subject to 
fund termination, unless that program was shown to be in fact 
administered in a discriminatory manner or infected by a dis- 
criminatory environment. 
If the funds provided by the grant are administered in a 
discriminatory manner, or if they support a program which is 
infected by a discriminatory environment, then termination of 
such funds is proper. But there will also be cases from time to 
time where a particular program, within a state, within a 
county, within a district, even within a school (in short, within 
a "political entity or part thereof"), is effectively insulated from 
otherwise unlawful activities. Congress did not intend that such 
a program suffer for the sins of others. HEW was denied the 
183. Id. at 1071-72. 
184. Id. at 1071, 1074. 
185. Id. at 1074. 
186. Id. at 1075. 
187. Id. at 1075-76. 
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right to condemn programs by association. The statute pre- 
scribes a policy of disassociation of programs in the fact finding 
process. Each must be considered on its own merits to determine 
whether or not it is in compliance with the Act. . . . Schools 
and programs are not condemned enmasse or in gross, with the 
good and the bad condemned together, but the termination 
power reaches only those programs which would utilize federal 
money for unconstitutional ends.t88 
The court recognized that a program not operated in a dis- 
criminatory fashion may still be so affected by a discriminatory 
environment as to render it violative of title VI. But since the 
contrary possibility exists, HEW cannot presume discrimination. 
Rather, before taking action in any case, HEW must "make find- 
ings of fact indicating either that a particular program is itself 
administered in a discriminatory manner, or is so affected by 
discriminatory practices elsewhere in the school system that it 
thereby becomes discriminatory." lag 
In conclusion, the Finch case establishes two fundamental 
principles: (1) Title VI's prohibitions and sanctions apply to pro- 
grams, not recipient institutions or entities. (2) No program vio- 
lates title VI unless, as a matter of fact, it is operated discrimina- 
torily or is affected to some unspecified degree by the discrimina- 
tory environment of the operating institution. These principles 
take on added significance in light of HEW'S reliance on the 
Finch case in the comments accompanying its final title IX regu- 
lation. lgO 
HEW uses the Finch case in those comments, however, in a 
particularly puzzling manner. The Department first quotes the 
"particular education program" language of section 902 of title 
IX that limits the permissible effect of fund termination and 
pledges to interpret that section consistent with section 602 of 
title VI. HEW then concludes that "[tlherefore, an education 
program or activity or part thereof operated by a recipient of 
Federal financial assistance administered by the Department will 
be subject to the requirements of this regulation if it [the pro- 
gram or the recipient institution?] receives or benefits from such 
assi~tance."~~' HEW attempts to support the broad coverage of 
the regulation, however, by quoting language from the Finch case 
188. Id. at  1078. 
189. Id. at 1079. 
190. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975). 
191. Id. 
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dealing with the "tainting" effect of discrimination: "Federal 
funds may be terminated under title VI upon a finding that they 
'are infected by a discriminatory environment . . . . ? ,9192 
Although puzzling at  first, HEW'S use of the Finch case re- 
veals an additional premise underlying the institutional approach 
of the title IX regulation: If any program, whether federally 
funded or not, is operated discriminatorily, all other programs of 
the operating institution, including those receiving federal assis- 
tance, are so tainted by the discrimination as to render them 
violative of title IX. (The first presumption-the "benefit" 
theory-has been mentioned before and will be analyzed in more 
detail later.)lg3 That use, however, arguably also constitutes 
abuse, for while the Finch court agreed that one program may in 
fact be tainted by the discrimination in another program, it for- 
bade HEW from presuming that taint. Whether or not a funded 
program is so tainted by discrimination as to render it violative 
of the statute is in all cases a question of fact."' If HEW cannot 
presume that discrimination in one program taints all programs 
either as an aid in establishing a statutory violation or as a basis 
for terminating federal financial assistance, it is difficult to imag- 
ine how the Department could be justified in using that presump- 
tion to expand the scope of its regulatory powers. 
Nevertheless, one of the first commentators on title IX 
argued that the tainting presumption should be used to expand 
the scope of the statute's prohibiton.lg5 If a federally funded pro- 
192. Id. The entire paragraph reads: 
Title IX requires in 20 U.S.C. 1682, that termination or refusal to grant or 
continue such assistance "shall be limited in its effect to the particular educa- 
tion program or activity or part thereof in which noncompliance has been 
found." The interpretation of this provision in title IX will be consistent with 
the interpretation of similar language contained in title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d-1). Therefore, an education program or activity or 
part thereof operated by a recipient of Federal financial assistance administered 
by the Department will be subject to the requirements of this regulation if it 
receives or benefits from such assistance. This interpretation is consistent with 
the only case specifically ruling on the language contained in title VI, which 
holds that Federal funds may be terminated under title VI upon a finding that 
they "are infected by a discriminatory environment . . ." Board of Public In- 
struction of Taylor County, Florida v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 
1969). 
Id. 
193. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra; notes 229-236 and accompanying 
text infra. 
194. See notes 184-189 and accompanying text supra. 
195. Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Dis- 
crimination in Public Schools, 53 TEX. L. REV. 103, 111-12 (1974). 
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gram is tainted by discrimination in another, nonfunded pro- 
gram, both programs should be "considered part of the  same 
program for purposes of bringing the latter [nonfunded pro- 
gram] within the reach of Title IX."lg6 Nothing supports such a 
proposition, however, other than a desire to give title IX as wide 
a scope as possible. The statute prohibits sex discrimination not 
in discriminatory programs that taint funded programs but only 
in "any education program and activity receiving Federal finan- 
cial assistance." lg7 To bring nonassisted but tainting programs 
within the scope of title IX7s prohibition, as the commentator 
suggested and as HEW has done with its regulatory scheme,1gR is
to extend that prohibition beyond the limits set by Congress. 
As a practical matter, however, the regulation promulgated 
by HEW for funded programs may serve as a useful, although not 
mandatory, guideline for nonfunded programs. If an educational 
institution is unable to effectively insulate discriminatory prac- 
tices in a nonfunded program, those practices may taint a funded 
program to such an extent that the latter must be deemed in 
violation of title IX and thus subject to fund termination or other 
remedial action.lg9 To avert fund termination, the institution 
would be obligated to end the discriminatory practices in the 
nonfunded program, even though that program is outside the 
scope of title IX's prohibition. If the institution elects such a 
course, guidelines or regulations promulgated by the federal de- 
partment or agency holding the fund termination ax and outlin- 
ing the steps necessary, in the agency's view, to eliminate dis- 
crimination in the nonfunded program would be a useful aid to 
the institution. 
Before leaving the Finch case and its implications for title IX 
interpretation, an argument advanced by proponents of the regu- 
lation and designed to circumvent the programmatic approach 
and evidentiary standard mandated by that case should be con- 
sidered. The Center for National Policy Review has contended 
that the "limitations on the scope of section 902, the statutory 
sanction for noncompliance with section 901, are independent 
196. Id. (emphasis added). 
197. 20 U.S.C. 4 1681(a) (Supp. IV, 1974); note 1 supra. 
198. The commentator correctly recognized that HEW'S cite to the Finch case in its 
comments accompanying the (then only proposed) regulation "indicates that tainted [but 
nonassisted] programs fall within the Secretary's ban, . . ." Comment, supra note 195, 
a t  113. 
199. For an excellent discussion of the ways in which one program can taint another 
program offered by the same institution see 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 194-96 
(memorandum prepared by Center for National Policy Review). 
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from and do not limit the general prohibition of section 901."200 
The Finch case, which mandated a programmatic approach, only 
construed title VI's equivalent of section 902, not section 901, and 
is therefore not dispositive. Section 901 is "properly interpreted 
as prohibiting discrimination based on sex in all aspects of a 
school program which is receiving Federal financial assistance .7'201 
Two cases, Lau v. Nicho1s2O2 and Bossier Parish School Board v. 
Lemon,203 support the institutional interpretation of section 901 
found in HEW's title IX regulation.204 
Severe difficulties plague this argument. First, the Lau and 
Bossier Parish decisions are doubtful authority for institution- 
wide application of title IX. In Bossier Parish, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the racially segregated school district 
"accepted federal financial assistance . . . and thereby brought 
its school system within the class of programs subject to the sec- 
tion 601 prohibition against di~crimination."~" In Lau, the Su- 
preme Court reviewed the challenge of C hinese-speaking students 
to the San Francisco School District's failure to provide bilingual 
training for a substantial proportion of its students who could 
speak only Chinese. In its decision for the students, based on 
section 601 of title VI, the Court referred to "the educational 
program7' of the school the concurring opinion also 
approved HEW's title VI guidelines that spoke of the "educa- 
tional program offered by a school distr i~t ."~" Clearly, the Court's 
approach was unitary or institutional and not programmatic in 
the narrow sense. Nevertheless, in both cases, the courts had no 
need to distinguish between an institutional and a programmatic 
application of title VI: Both the defendant school districts re- 
ceived federal funds into their general fiscs which were then used, 
presumably, to finance all their activities and programs.2nx Any 
1975 Hearings on Title IX  Regulation 191, 193. 
Id. a t  192-94 (emphasis omitted). 
414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967). 
1975 Hearings on Title I X  Regulation 193. 
370 F.2d a t  852. 
414 U.S. a t  568. 
Id. a t  570 (Stewart, J., concurring), quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 11595 (1970). 
208. The Bossier Parish School District received federal funds under 20 U.S.C. $ 6  
236-241 (1970). 370 F.2d a t  851. Such funds, commonly referred to as "federal impact 
funds," are paid directly to the school district; the use or purpose of the funds is not 
restricted beyond the requirement that they be used for "operation of schools." OFFICE OF 
EDUCATION, HEW, ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC LAWS 81-874 & 81-815: TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION 5 (1971); see 20 U.S.C. § 240 (1970). In fact, 
part of the policy of the statutes providing for "federal impact funds" is to replace funds 
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distinction between programs would have been immaterial since 
all programs and activities comprising the total offering of the 
defendants would have been subject to section 601 even under a 
rigorous programmatic approach. In short, since the courts did 
not have the institutional vs. programmatic issue before them, it 
is simply unknown what they would have done had less than all 
of the programs offered by the school districts received federal 
assistance. Only when confronted with such a factual setting 
would a court be required to determine the scope of section 601 
of title VI, or section 901 of title IX, and choose between an 
institutional and a programmatic application of the statute.20g 
Also, the Center's argument that section 901 is broader in 
application than section 902 inevitably leads to the conclusion 
that Congress prohibited some offensive conduct without provid- 
ing a truly effective means of enforcing that p roh ib i t i~n .~ '~  That 
lost to a school district's general fund when private, taxable property within the district 
is acquired by the federal government and thus removed from the tax rolls. 20 U.S.C. (5 
236 (1970). The San Francisco School District also received, among other types of federal 
aid, "federal impact funds." See Brief for Petitioners a t  45, Lau v. Nichols, 416 U.S. 563 
(1974); OFFICE OF EDUCATION, HEW, ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC LAWS 81-874 & 81-815: 
TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION 38 (1974) (San Fran- 
cisco School District received $1,592,330 in "federal impact funds" in 1973). 
209. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with such a factual setting 
in Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969); it opted for "pro- 
grammatic specificity." See notes 184-189 and accompanying text supra. 
210. Section 902 of title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. IV, 1974), provides that compli- 
ance with the rules, regulations, and orders promulgated pursuant to that section may be 
effected by (1) fund termination or (2) "any other means authorized by law." The latter 
phrase refers to judicial, as opposed to administrative, remedies. Application of the identi- 
cal phrase in title VI has been explained in these terms: 
[I)f the violation cannot be corrected informally, HEW may submit a recom- 
mendation to the Department of Justice to commmence appropriate proceed- 
ings, one of which may be an action under state or local law. A Justice Depart- 
ment suit may seek judicial enforcement of assurances by the recipient of federal 
financial assistance that its program is in compliance with Title VI and its 
regulations; such assurances are required in every application for financial assis- 
tance as a condition of approval or continuance and specifically provide that the 
United States has a right to seek judicial enforcement of them. 
Slippen, Administrative Enforcement of Civil Rights in Public Education: Title VI, HEW, 
and the Civil Rights Reviewing Authority, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 931, 933 (1975) (footnotes 
omitted). The extent of the use, if any, of the second remedy could not be ascertained. 
Nevertheless, all commentators agree that, in the title VI context, fund termination or 
the threat thereof has been the device that has rendered title VI such an extremely 
effective tool in eliminating discrimination in federally assisted programs. See, e.g., Dunn, 
Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42 (1967); 
Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second 
Decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742,756-58 (1974); Slippen, 
supra. In addition, see 117 CONG. REC. 30408 (1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh: "The civil 
rights experience . . . indicates that the very possibility of such a sanction [fund termina- 
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Congress would engage in such a hollow exercise cannot be ac- 
cepted without difficulty. Further, and perhaps most persu- 
asively, there is no significant difference in the language of the 
two sections to indicate that "education program" in section 901 
has a meaning different from "education program" in section 
902.211 Standard rules of statutory construction mandate that 
identical phrases in such close proximity within a statute, absent 
some clear indication to the contrary, be given the same meaning 
and scope.212 Finally, if section 902 applies to specific programs 
while section 901 applies on an institution-wide basis, as the Cen- 
ter argues, HEW's rulemaking power under section 902 would 
appear to be inadequate to its purpose-effectuation of the provi- 
sions of section 901. Section 902 authorizes HEW (or any other 
federal department or agency) to promulgate regulations only 
"with respect to" education programs receiving federal financial 
assistance administered by HEW.213 In other words, HEW cannot 
promulgate rules covering anything other than a section 902 
"education program." If that  term in section 902 is more limited 
in scope than the same term in section 901, HEW's authority is 
necessarily limited to a point where it cannot fully effectuate the 
provisions of section 901. I t  is doubtful that Congress intended 
such a limitation on HEW's rulemaking power. If it did, the 
institutional approach of HEW's title IX regulation is clearly 
ultra vires. If it did not, the scope of section 902, which under the 
Finch case requires programmatic ~pecificity,~'~ must be con- 
strued as identical to the scope of section 901. 
d. T h e  program-as-institution issue. The preceding por- 
tions of section III,B,3 evaluate, in the somewhat complex form 
tion] has worked wonders."). The last cite and quotation is typical in its indication that 
to the Congressmen involved in passage of title VI and title IX fund termination consti- 
tutes the effective remedy of those statutes. 
211. The Center for National Policy Review points up minor differences in the lan- 
guage of the two sections but fails t o  identify and ascribe any significance or materiality 
to those differences. 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 194. 
211. See, e.g., Schooler v. United States, 231 F.2d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 1956) ("In the 
absence of anything in the statute clearly indicating an intention to the contrary, where 
the same word or phrase is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be 
used in the same sense throughout . . . ."); Hull v. American Wire Weavers' Protective 
Assoc., 159 F. Supp. 425, 430 (N.D. Ohio 1957) ("It is a settled canon of construction that 
words used in one place in an enactment have the same meaning in every other place in 
the statute."); Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman, 76 N.J. Super. 90, 105, 183 A.2d 788, 796 
(1962) ("It is a general rule of construction that where a word or a phrase occurs more 
than once in a statute, it should have the same meaning throughout unless there is a clear 
indication to the contrary."). 
. 213. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. IV, 1974); note 2 supra. 
214. See notes 184-189 and accompanying text supra. 
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in which both proponents and opponents of the regulation have 
cast the issue, whether HEW's institutional approach is ultra 
vires. A much simpler formulation of the issue merits considera- 
tion: Is "education program" as that term is used in title IX 
coextensive with the total and combined educational activities of 
a school district, college, university, or other educational institu- 
tion? In other words, does a university, for example, provide an 
"education program" or does i t  provide numerous separable pro- 
grams and activities? Obviously, if a university were deemed to 
offer a unitary program, the ultra vires issue considered in this 
section would be resolved; there would be no difference between 
an institution and a program and no disparity between the insti- 
tutional approach of HEW's title IX regulation and the program- 
matic approach that many argue title IX mandates. 
Some indirect authority for thg institution-as-program view 
exists. In two title VI cases, Lau u. Nichols215 before the Supreme 
Court and Bossier Parish School Board v. Lern~n~~Qefore the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the courts approached the defen- 
dant school districts as if they provided a unitary education pro- 
gram. But as noted in the previous discussion of these two 
cases,2i7 since both defendant school districts received federal 
funds into their general fiscs, the courts had no need to distin- 
guish between a unitary and a separable approach to the pro- 
grams offered by the school districts. 
Other title VI cases, and most groups involved in construing 
or analyzing title IX, including HEW, view the various facets and 
activities of an educational institution as separable, distinct edu- 
cation programs. This is certainly the approach of opponents of 
the regulation. One university president testifying during the 
1975 congressional hearings on the title IX regulation stated that 
"program or activity is subsumed in the institution. My institu- 
tion has 100 programs or activities . . . . The intent of the statute 
is 'any education program or activity,' and not any i n s t i t u t i ~ n . " ~ ~ ~  
HEW also, both in the regulation and in extrinsic statements, has 
adhered to this approach. For example, HEW's Secretary Wein- 
berger, in testifying before Congress in the 1975 hearings, spoke 
of the "educational programs or activities of a school district, 
215. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
216. 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967). 
217. See notes 205-209 and accompanying text supra. 
218. 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 260-61 (testimony of Dr. Dallin H. Oaks, 
President, Brigham Young University). 
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institution of higher education, or other entity which receives 
Federal funds for any of [its] programs."21g The regulation 
speaks of the "educational programs or activities" which a recipi- 
ent institution operates.nR In addition, commentators reviewing 
title IX have indicated that a single institution may and generally 
does operate various separable education programs and that an 
athletic program within a high school, for example, constitutes an 
education program as that term is used in the statute.221 
The latter approach to title IX-that separable education 
programs exist within a single institution-appears correct. Con- 
gressmen in the debates preceding passage of title IX generally 
used the word program to refer not to the total program of an 
educational institution but to smaller-scale activities within the 
institution.222 The following query of Representative Steiger is 
typical: "For example, are we saying that if in the English depart- 
ment they receive no funds from the Federal Government that 
therefore that program is exempt?"223 Also, cases construing title 
VI, some decided prior to enactment of title IX, recognize that a 
school district or university operates various education programs 
within the total scope of its activities.224 In Board of Public In- 
struction u. for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap- 
peals identified a t  least three separate education programs re- 
ceiving federal aid within a school district accused of racially 
discriminatory conduct: a program for the education of children 
of low-income families, a program involving supplementary edu- 
cation centers, and a program for the education of adults with no 
college degree.226 It should be noted that the court equated "pro- 
gram" with "federal grant statute," basing that view on the man- 
ner in which congressmen used the word in debates preceding the 
enactment of title VI.227 
In conclusion, it appears that the term "education program" 
from title IX is not equivalent in scope to an entire educational 
219. Id. at 436, 438. 
220. 45 C.F.R. 4 86.9(a) (1975). See also id. 4 86.4(a), 4 86.11, 4 86.31(a). 
221. See, e.g., Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing 
Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53 TEX. L. REV. 103, 107-13 (1974). 
222. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 39256 (1971) (Representative Steiger); id. (Representa- 
tive Waggonner); id. at 30406 (Senator Dominick). 
223. Id. at 39256. 
224. See, e.g., Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969); 
McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M. 1970). 
225. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). 
226. Id. at 1074. 
227. Id. at 1077-78. 
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institution; rather, it refers to such educational activities as an 
athletic program, an English department, ROTC, or a program 
outlined in and funded by a federal grant statute. The argument 
that the term "education program" is unitary and refers to the 
total activities of a school district or university is therefore una- 
vailable to support the institutional approach of HEW's title IX 
regulation. But, as noted above, HEW has not resorted to that 
argument in support cf its position.228 
e. Presumption vs. fact: the "benefit" theory and institu- 
tional application of title IX. As noted above, proponents of an 
institutional application of title IX have urged a "benefit" theory 
in support of their position: Federal assistance received by one 
program benefits all other programs within the institution by 
"releasing" institutional funds-which would otherwise go to the 
recipient program-for use in those other programs.2zg It should 
be noted that this theory is based (1) on a fundamental presump- 
tion concerning the effect in fact of federal assistance on educa- 
tion programs and institutions and (2) on the assumption that the 
term "receiving federal financial assistance" includes the concept 
of "benefitting from." The latter aspect of the theory was treated 
above.2N The portion of the comment that follows analyzes the 
first characteristic of the "benefit" theory: the presumption that 
federal assistance received by one program benefits all other pro- 
grams within the institution. 
Board of Public Instruction v .  Finch231 established that 
whether prohibited discrimination exists in or taints a program 
is a question of fact. Likewise, for purposes of applying either title 
IX's prohibition or its sanctions, it appears evident that a pro- 
gram must receive in fact-or, if the broad construction is 
adopted, be benefited by in fact-federal financial assistance. 
Any other approach would render meaningless the limitation in- 
herent in the phrase "receiving federal financial assistance." Fur- 
ther, if a program does not actually receive federal aid, and there- 
fore falls without the scope of section 901, no authorization ap- 
pears for administrative regulation of the program. The statutory 
authorization for department or agency rulemaking in section 902 
limits that rulemaking power to effectuation of section 901's pro- 
h i b i t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Therefore, to the extent HEW's title IX regulation 
- -- 
228. See notes 219-220 and accompanying text supra. 
229. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra. 
230. See notes 117-120 and accompanying text supra. 
231. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). 
232. 20 U.S.C. 8 1682 (Supp. IV, 1974); note 2 supra. 
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covers education programs and activities that  are presumed to 
but do not in fact receive-or perhaps, benefit from-federal fin- 
ancial assistance, it is ultra vires. 
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the "benefit" theory's 
presumption sufficiently conforms to actuality that HEW's insti- 
tutional approach may be viewed as warranted. The very nature 
of federal assistance to many education programs, however, 
greatly reduces the accuracy of HEW'S presumption and thus the 
validity of its institutional approach. Many federal grant statutes 
are subject to what is termed a maintenance of effort require- 
ment.233 Under such a requirement, the sponsoring institution is 
obligated to continue funding a t  historic levels a program newly 
receiving federal funds. The net result is twofold: (1) The feder- 
ally assisted program receives an actual increase in its funding, 
and (2) the sponsoring institution does not have "released" to i t  
institutional funds it may then expend on nonfunded programs 
and activities. 
The ubiquity of maintenance of effort provisions is demon- 
strated by an examination of chapter 28 of title 20, United States 
Code, the chapter dealing with federal assistance to institutions 
of and students enrolled in higher education. A cursory survey 
revealed eleven separate provisions requiring maintenance of ef- 
fort.234 Of those eleven, seven appear in the Education Amend- 
ments of 1972, the same Act containing title IX.235 More signifi- 
cant than the total number of such provisions, however, is the 
amount of federal assistance subject to them. For example, one 
provision covers all grants to students in attendance at  institu- 
tions of higher education and requires participating colleges and 
universities to continue spending "in its own scholarship and 
student-aid program, from sources other than funds received 
[from the federal government], not less than the average ex- 
penditure per year made for that purpose during the most recent 
period of three fiscal years preceding the effective date of the 
agreement, . . ."236 This wide use of the maintenance of effort 
concept throughout federal education assistance programs dem- 
onstrates the inaccuracy of the presumption of the "benefit" 
theory underlying HEW's institutional approach. Given that sig- 
233. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. $$ 1022, 1088c (Supp. IV, 1974). 
234. 20 U.S.C. $$ 1022, 1023, 1054, 1070e, 1088c, 1134s(c), 1135b-7 (Supp. IV, 1974); 
20 U.S.C. $$ 1087b, 1119c-2(c), 1124, 1125 (1970). 
235. 20 U.S.C. $ 5  1022,1023,1054,1070e, 1088c, 1134s(c), 113513-7 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
236. 20 U.S.C. 4 1088c (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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nificant inaccuracy, HEW should not be permitted to use the 
presumption as a basis for expanding the scope of its regulatory 
power. 
4. Policy arguments for and against a narrow construction of 
title IX 
Proponents of HEW'S title IX regulation argue that certain 
practical considerations, as well as a general view of the interests 
served by the authorizing statute, mandate a broad construction 
of the statute and support the institutional approach of the regu- 
lation. First, a narrow construction of title IX, one requiring pro- 
grammatic application of both the statute's prohibition and its 
sanctions, would be difficult to administer. The enforcing federal 
department or agency would be required to identify which educa- 
tion programs receive federal funding and which do not. The 
resultant need to trace federal funds would impose an extraordi- 
nary work load on federal officials in addition to requiring exces- 
sive federal intervention in school affairs. These burdens would 
render title IX ineffective as an antidiscrimination device.237 
Experience indicates that these fears of administrative diffi- 
culty are probably excessive and unwarranted. After the Finch 
case imposed a requirement of programmatic specificity on HEW 
in its title VI enforcement efforts,23s ome commentators forecast 
that the administrative burden would be unbearable? "Admin- 
istratively, a program-by-program determination of discrimina- 
tion will place an enormous burden upon an understaffed 
agency. . . . The added work load will only exacerbate the diffi- 
cult conditions and essentially render section 602 ineffective 
when applied to  school de~egregation."~~"hat forecast has 
proven to be wrong. HEW has followed the Finch  requirement^,^^' 
the administrative burdens have not been unbearable, and title 
VI has continued to be an extremely effective desegregation de- 
vice.242 A contrary result of programmatic application of title IX 
is unlikely. 
237. See, e.g., 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 217 (statement of Holly Knox, 
NOW); id. at 296 (testimony of Dr. Norma Raffel, Education Committee, WEAL); id. at 
416 (prepared statement of Nellie M. Varner). 
238. See notes 184-189 and accompanying text supra. 
239. See, e.g., 23 VAND. L. REV. 149 (1969), noting Board of Public Instruction v. 
Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). 
240. Id. at  155. 
241. Slippen, Administrative Enforcement of Civil Rights i n  Public Education: Title 
VI, H E W ,  and the Civil Rights Reviewing Authority, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 931,941-42 (1975). 
242. See note 210 supra. 
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Also, the nature of federal education assistance programs 
makes unmanageable administrative burdens and additional fed- 
eral intervention less than probable. Most federal education as- 
sistance programs already require recipient institutions to make 
reports, keep records, and provide for such other "fiscal control 
and fund accounting procedures as may be necessary to insure 
proper disbursement of and accounting for funds made available 
under" the federal grant statute.243 With such "fiscal control and 
fund accounting procedures," reports, and records already in ex- 
istence, it appears that federal officers engaged in title IX en- 
forcement can readily identify the specific programs receiving 
federal aid. Equally important, they can do so without additional 
intervention into school affairs. 
Proponents of the regulation raise a second argument. Title 
IX was drafted to serve the interest in eliminating sex discrimina- 
tion in education. The statute should therefore be construed 
broadly and given the widest possible application in order that 
that interest may be fully ~indicated.~" Those who make this 
argument, however, overlook the readily apparent fact that Con- 
gress, when enacting title IX, was also concerned with the protec- 
tion and vindication of other interests, certain of which in some 
contexts necessarily conflict with the interest in eliminating sex 
discrimination in education. Of those countervailing interests, 
Congress was perhaps most concerned with the interest in pre- 
venting the destructive intrusion of federal control into the auton- 
omous and pluralistic world of American higher education.245 
Throughout the debates preceding enactment of title IX, con- 
gressmen, including the chief sponsors and proponents of the 
title,246 repeatedly articulated an "unwillingness to require the 
243. 20 U.S.C. 8 1054(c)(l)(D)-(E) (Supp. IV, 1974); G., id. §§ 1022(2)-(3), 
1023(a)(l), 1070e(c)(l)(A), 1070e-l(c)(l)(A), 1134s(c)(2), 1135b-7(a)(4), (6); 20 U.S.C. 88 
1087b(3)-(4), 1119~-2(~)(3)-(4) 1970). 
244. See, e.g., 2975 Hearings on Title ZX Regulation 324 (prepared statement of Dr. 
Bernice Sandler); id. a t  163-64 (testimony of Representative Mink). 
245. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 37784 (1971) (Representative Quie); id. a t  37786-87 
(Representative Sheuer); id. a t  37790 (Representative Erlenborn); id. at 39249 (Represent- 
ative Erlenborn); id. a t  39254 (Representative Conte). See generally Buek & Orleans, Sex 
Discrimination-A Bar to a Democratic Education: Overview of Title ZX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, 6 CONN. L. REV. 1, 5, 16 (1973). 
246. During debates, Representative Green made the following comment: 
I think we ought to respect the autonomy of the institution and let the institu- 
tions determine their priorities and needs. The Federal Government has no 
business saying if you do not do what we have decided is important-you would 
not get any funds. I say if we follow this course, we will have more and more 
Federal control, which is what I want to avoid. 
117 CONG. REC. 37785 (1971). 
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federal government to intrude into determining the nature of pri- 
vate educational organizations, and a conviction that one of the 
essential elements of a free society is the diverse nature of its 
educational  institution^."^^^ 
Even prior to the title IX debates, however, Congress recog- 
nized and translated into legislation this interest in preserving 
the autonomy of American higher education from federal regula- 
tion and control. When Congress significantly increased federal 
assistance to education with the Higher Education Act of 1965, 
it provided: 
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to author- 
ize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United 
States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the 
curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or person- 
nel of any educational institution, or over the selection of library 
resources by an educational institution.248 
Thus, in the title IX debates, congressmen could accurately de- 
scribe the policy against federal intervention in higher education 
as “long- tand ding.""^ 
That policy, and the interests it seeks to further, influenced 
the drafting of title IX. This is most readily seen in the various 
exceptions provided to the general prohibition of section 901.2.50 It 
can also be argued, however, that Congress, realizing that title 
IX's prohibition would necessarily operate to reduce the plural- 
ism and autonomy of American education, carefully limited the 
scope of that general prohibition itself. This argument is sup- 
ported in part by Congress's rejection of the institutional ap- 
proach of Senator Bayh's original amendment and the Nixon 
administration bill in favor of the more narrowly drawn bill intro- 
duced by Representative Green.251 
In conclusion, with title IX Congress sought to serve legiti- 
mate interests in addition to the primary interest in eliminating 
sex discrimination in education. The narrowing provisions of the 
statutes should not be viewed, therefore, as accidents of the legis- 
lative process needing to be corrected or glossed over by a regula- 
tory scheme insensitive to all of the interests that Congress sought 
247. Buek & Orleans, supra note 245, at 5; see note 245 supra. 
248. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 804(a), 79 Stat. 1270. 
The current prohibition against federal control of education is found at 20 U.S.C. § 
1232a (Supp. IV, 1974). 
249. 117 CONG. REC. 37784 (1971) (Representative Quie). 
250. 20 U.S.C. 4 1681(a)(1)-(6) (Supp. IV, 1974); note 1 supra. 
251. See notes 35-53 and accompanying text supra. 
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to accommodate. Since Congress was not single-minded when it 
drafted title IX, it would be a mistake for a court and an ultra 
vires act for an agency to disregard the limiting features of the 
statute and apply it in a single-minded fashion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It should be remembered that the previous sections are con- 
cerned with what Congress did and not with what Congress could 
have done or can do now. Some of the most astute critics of 
HEW'S title IX regulation have conceded that had Congress cho- 
sen to regulate all programs and activities of an educational insti- 
tution even though only one of those programs received funding, 
it could have done so within constitutional  stricture^.^" Yet if 
Congress, with its title IX prohibition, did not cut such a wide, 
leveling swath-and the short conclusion of the preceding sec- 
tions is that i t  did not-it should be of no little concern that a 
segment of government largely immune from the democratic pro- 
cesses has advanced without authority its regulatory power over 
a part of society as crucial as education. 
252. See 1975 Hearings on Title IX Regulation 261 (Dr. Dallin Oaks, president, 
Brigham Young University). 
